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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
ANTHONY JAMES VALDEZ, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
CaseNo.20040633-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
UPON GRANT OF CERTIORARI REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals the decision in State v. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, 95 P.2d 291, 
which reversed defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (West 2004); possession of a dangerous weapon by 
a restricted person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76- 10-503(2)(a) 
(West 2004); and criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-106 (West 2004). See Addendum A (Opinion). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to its grant of certiorari review. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004). See 
Addendum B (Order Granting Certiorari Review). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
The State raises two issues concerning the court of appeals' analysis and application 
of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting racial discrimination in the exercise 
of peremptory strikes), and its progeny, J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (prohibiting 
peremptory strikes based solely on gender). Because the analytical underpinnings are 
identical, "Batson" will be used generically to refer to both racial- and gender-based 
objections. 
Issue 1: Is a Batson objection timely if it is made after the trial jury is sworn and the 
remainder of the venire excused? 
Issue 2: Did the court of appeals fail to apply the Batson standards and analysis 
established by this Court and the United States Supreme Court? 
Standards of Review: On certiorari, the decision of the court of appeal is reviewed 
for correctness. Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12, \ 9, 84 P.3d 1201. 
What constitutes a timely objection is a question of law. Cf. State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, f^ 
38, 24 P.3d 948 (for-cause challenge). The determination of the applicable legal standards 
is also a question of law. See Thomas, 2004 UT 12,19; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994). 
Preservation: This Court granted certiorari review of Issues 1 & 2, which were 
raised by the State and addressed in Valdez, 2004 UT App 214. See Add A&B. See also 
Brief of Appellee [BrAplee] at 12-39. 
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STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 185 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is attached in Addendum C, together with 
any other provision cited in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, child abuse, 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and criminal mischief (R. 35-38). 
A jury trial was held on October 29-30, 2002 (R. 131-34). 
The initial jury venire consisted of 11 men and 14 women (R. 94). Voir dire was fully 
conducted (R209: 10-66). Three men and two women were excused for cause without 
objection (R. 94). A third woman was excused for cause on defendant's motion over the 
prosecutor's objection (R. 94; R209: 66-69). The prosecutor used four peremptory strikes 
against women; the defense used four peremptory strikes against men (R. 94). The selected 
jury consisted of four men and four women (R. 94). Defendant did not object when the 
prosecutor exercised his peremptory strikes or when the selected jurors were announced 
(R209: 70). 
The remainder of the venire was excused from service (id.). The trial jury was sworn 
(id.). The court trial preliminarily instructed the jury (R209: 70-76). The information was 
read (R209: 76). The jury was excused for lunch (id.). 
After the jurors left the courtroom, the court discussed potential jury instructions with 
counsel (R209: 76-78). Defendant stipulated that a previous conviction for a violent felony 
rendered him a "restricted person" for purposes of the weapon charge (R209: 77-78). The 
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parties agreed that the jury would not be informed of defendant's prior conviction and a 
special verdict form would be used to determine if he possessed a gun on the date charged 
ad.). 
The court then asked the parties if they had "[ajnything else" to discuss before the 
noon recess (R209: 78). For the first time, defense counsel questioned the prosecutor's 
peremptory strikes: "Your Honor, I noticed that when we were doing the jury selection that 
the State struck all women, and that's a basis for a Batson challenge" (R209: 78). The trial 
court pointed out that Batson was not a gender-based case (id.). Defense counsel continued: 
Whatever the follow-up case is that extended Batson [sic], the gender, and I 
think at this point all I need to do is establish that there was a pattern. And I 
think the fact that the State used all of their peremptories on women - 1 don't 
know if there's any better evidence to show that there is a pattern of- based 
on gender. I don't think we had any minorities at all, even Ms. Gonzalez 
didn't appear to be Hispanic, so I don't think I'd have any based on race, but 
on the fact that the State moved every single one of the peremptories were 
based on-. 
(id.).1 See Addendum D (Objection and Ruling). 
The prosecutor responded: "[Djefense counsel's objection is untimely. We've seated 
the jury, sworn the jury, the proper Batson challenge must be made prior to that point" (id.). 
*The court of appeals overstated the basis of defendant's objection: "Valdez's 
counsel noted that the State used all four of its peremptory challenges to exclude women 
from the jury. Valdez further noted that in a domestic violence jury trial, gender issues 
tend to be highly charged. Ultimately, he argued, the State's exclusion of only women 
from the jury cannot be disregarded, on its face, in the context of the case." Valdez, 2004 
UTApp 214,^2. 
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The trial court asked: "Well, not withstanding that, can you give me a basis to rebut 
[a] Batson type challenge?" (R209:19)? 
The prosecutor then explained his peremptory strikes against Lydia Valerio, Joyce 
Gonzalez, Tamara Thornton, and Paula Morley (R. 94; R209: 79-80). See Add, D. 
Lydia Valerio was the officer manager for a state-wide non-profit agency which 
provides medical, housing, training, and employment assistance to brain-injured individuals 
(R209:14-16). See Addendum E (Voir Dire Examination). Valerio was personally involved 
in retraining individuals with sustained brain injuries and in providing housing and medical 
referrals to others (id.). The prosecutor explained that he struck her because of her 
employment, which he believed might make her "somewhat overly compassionate" (R209: 
79) {Add. D). 
Joyce Gonzalez cleaned her adult children's homes (R209: 18-19) {Add. E). She 
wanted to "retire," but her children, all in their forties, would not let her quit (id.). She 
claimed to have heard about the case on the news (R209: 35) {Add. E). She remembered 
"hearing about the break-in in the area, just the address," which she claimed was "Ensign 
Avenue" (R209: 65). When the court informed her that the incident had not happened on 
Ensign Avenue, but on Emery Street, Gonzalez asserted that she was certain it was the same 
incident because "I read the newspaper every day" (R209:65-66) {Add. E). She admitted that 
2Based on this question, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court 
"ignor[ed] the State's argument... [and] impliedly found good cause under rule 18 
[Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] to allow a challenge to the State's peremptory strikes 
beyond the usual [time] limits." Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, \ 10. 
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her memory was vague, but insisted she remembered the "name and the incident" and knew 
the facts "sounded familiar to me" (R209: 66). When asked if she could disregard any prior 
information she may heard about the case in reaching a verdict, Gonzalez only answered, "I 
think I could" (id.). The prosecutor peremptorily struck her based on her voir dire responses. 
He felt that even though she claimed that her prior knowledge of the case would not affect 
her judgment, her responses were too "matter of fact" (R209: 79) (Add. D). 
Tamara Thornton worked for her husband's family-owned plumbing and heating 
business (R209:14). She remembered hearing about a house break-in on the television news, 
but was not sure if it was the same case and could not remember any details (R209: 34). She 
had previously served on a jury, which returned a verdict of manslaughter (R209: 49-50). 
See Add. E. The prosecutor noted that, like Gonzalez, Thornton had heard about the case 
(R209: 79) (Add. D). But due to the lapse of time between jury selection and defendant's 
Batson objection, the prosecutor could not recall specifically what Thornton had said about 
the case (R209: 79). The prosecutor explained that he struck Thornton because she had 
previously served on a jury, which had returned a verdict of manslaughter, a verdict the 
prosecutor assumed represented a "one-step reduction" from the charged offense (id.). 
Paula Morley was a part-time Title I-fimded school aide, who also taught piano at 
home (R209: 27-28) (Add. £). The prosecutor explained that he had "agonized" over 
whether he should use his last strike against her or the next juror, Ron Hardy, who was a 
Vietnam veteran, hunted as a hobby, and had a brother in prison, whom Hardy believed was 
properly incarcerated (R209: 29-30, 45-46, 79-80). The prosecutor explained that he had 
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consulted with his co-prosecutor, who favored keeping Mr. Hardy on the jury based on his 
firearm experience (R209: 79-80) (Add. D). As with Valerio, the prosecutor felt that 
Morley's employment might make her "overly compassionate" and more inclined to "let 
bygones be bygones" (R209: 80). Comparing Morley with Hardy, he chose to remove 
Morley (id.). 
After the prosecutor explained his strikes, defense counsel was silent and did not 
object to the explanations or assert contrary facts (R209: 80). The trial court then ruled: 
All right. Thank you. And Pm satisfied with your explanation. I find with 
regard to peremptory challenges No. 6, Tamara Thornton, No. 7 Linda Valerio, 
No. 10, Joyce Gonzalez, and No. 19, Paula Morely [sic] are gender neutral, 
they are related specifically to this case. They were clearly stated and they are 
specific and legitimate. Therefore I am denying the challenge based on 
gender. I also note this is a jury of four men and four women. 
(R209: 80) (Add. D). Again, defense counsel remained silent and did not object to the ruling 
or ask for additional findings (id.). 
Trial proceeded. Defendant was acquitted of aggravated assault of his girlfriend, 
Chrystal Jimenez, who recanted her prior statements implicating defendant, and of child 
abuse (committing domestic violence in the presence of their son) (R. 138-42; R211: 147-
48). The jury convicted defendant of aggravated burglary of Laura Abeyta's (Chrystal's 
friend's) apartment and of criminal mischief for slashing Chrystal's car tires (id.). He was 
also convicted of the weapon charge (R211: 147-49). On January 13, 2003, defendant was 
sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment (R. 178-80). 
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Defendant appealed his convictions (R. 184-85). The appeal was poured over to the 
court of appeals. 
The court of appeals concluded that rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, allows 
a Batson objection to be made any time "before evidence is presented" and, consequently, 
held that defendant's objection—made after the jury was sworn and the remainder of the 
venire excused, but prior the taking of evidence—was timely. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, 
fflf 7-11. See also Addendum C (Rule 18). Turning to the merits, the appellate court 
acknowledged that the prosecutor's explanations for the peremptory strikes were not 
inherently discriminatory. Id. at ^ 21 & 29. Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded 
that the explanations were "mere pretext as a matter of law" because they were not "tied to 
the issues, evidence, and context of the case at hand." Id. at *| 29. The court of appeals held 
that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to reject the prosecutor's explanations 
"outright" and instead proceeded to assess their credibility and validity. Id. at f 31. 
Accordingly, the court of appeals refused to review the trial court's ultimate finding that the 
strikes were made without discriminatory intent and reversed the trial court's denial of 
defendant's Batson objection. Id. 
Because the court of appeals reversed defendant's convictions based on its Batson 
determination, it did not address defendant's other claim that evidence of Battered Woman 
Syndrome (BWS) was erroneously admitted. Id. at If 17 n.2. 
The State petitioned for and was granted certiorari review of Valdez's Batson analysis 
and rulings. See Add. B. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts underlying defendant's convictions are not relevant to the Batson issues 
raised on certiorari review. Only a brief summary is provided. 
Defendant forced open the door of Laura Abeyta's apartment (R210: 16-18, 25-26, 
33-36,44,49-50). Laura, other adults, and their children were in the living room (R210:11-
12, 15, 18-20, 33-34, 48; R211: 94-95). Defendant displayed a gun and walked into the 
bathroom where his girlfriend, Chrystal Jimenez, was hiding (R210: 15, 18-20, 35, 37, 50-
51). He threatened to kill Chrystal in front of their young son (id.). Defendant then left the 
apartment and slashed the tires on Chrystal's car (R210:38-39,52). Chrystal fully recounted 
the incident during defendant's preliminary hearing, but at trial, recanted her prior statements 
and testimony (R207: 4-13; R210: 59-65, 80-82, 97-99). See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ^ 
4. Laura and the other eyewitnesses implicated defendant (R210:11-54; R211: 94-96). The 
jury acquitted ciefendant of the assaults involving Chrystal and their son, but convicted him 
of aggravated burglary (for the forced entry), felon in possession of a gun, and criminal 
mischief (for slashing the tires) (R211: 146-48). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue 1 -^  Timeliness. Until Valdez, federal and state courts, including the Utah Court 
of Appeals, uniformly recognized that a Batson objection to a peremptory strike is untimely 
if it is made after the jury process is completed. Strong policy reasons support strict 
enforcement of this time requirement. Moreover, requiring a Batson objection to be made 
prior to the trial jury being sworn and the remainder of the venire excused is consistent with 
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the contemporaneous objection rule and parallels the time restrictions placed on other types 
of objections to the composition of a jury. This Court should reverse the court of appeals' 
singular conclusion to the contrary. 
Issue 2 - Batson Analysis. This Court, as well as the United States Supreme Court, 
have established clear and distinct criteria for each of Batson's three analytical steps, 
including applicable standards of review. The court of appeals failed to apply these 
standards in Valdez. Had the court of appeals applied the proper standards, it would have 
concluded that the prosecutor's explanations for his peremptory strikes were gender-neutral 
and would have affirmed the trial court's ultimate determination of no discriminatory intent. 
If this Court determines defendant's Batson objection was untimely, it should reverse 
Part I of the Valdez opinion, but nevertheless clarify what constitutes proper Batson analysis 
and standards. If the objection is timely, this Court should review its merits, reverse Parts 
II-IV of the Valdez opinion, affirm the trial court's finding of no discriminatory intent, and 
reinstate defendant's convictions. In either case, the appeal should then be remanded to the 




PRECEDENT AND POLICY DO NOT SUPPORT VALDEZS SINGULAR 
CONCLUSION THAT A BATSON OBJECTION IS TIMELY IF MADE 
AFTER THE JURYIS SWORN AND THE REMAINDER OF THE VENIRE 
IS EXCUSED 
"Ordinarily, a party is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges for any 
reason at all, as long as that reason is related to his view concerning the outcome of the case 
to be tried." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). The privilege, however, "is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection 
Clause," which forbids a party from striking a potential juror solely on account of race or 
gender or on the assumption that a particular race or gender is unable to impartially consider 
the evidence. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (race); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 
(1994) (gender). See also State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, \ 14, 994 P.2d 177; State v. 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996). 
Under Batson and its progeny, a three step analysis applies: 
[0]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie 
case of [ ] discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the 
proponent of the strike to come forward with a [ ] neutral explanation (step 
two). If a [ ] neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide 
(step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful [ ] 
discrimination. 
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995). Accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8, % 17; 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547. 
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"Discrimination injury selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm 
to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from 
participation in the process. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140. Consequently, "if purposeful 
discrimination is ultimately found, reversal of the defendant's conviction is mandated, 
without regard to the harmlessness of the constitutional error." State v. Macial, 854 P.2d 
543, 545 (Utah App.) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 100), cert denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 
1993). 
In Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, 95 P.3d 291, the court of appeals acknowledges these 
standards, but misinterprets and misapplies them. These errors will be discussed in Point II. 
The court of appeals' initial error, however, is in ruling that a Batson objection to a 
peremptory strike may be made after the jury process is completed. See Valdez, 2004 UT 
App 214, fflf 7-11. No other court has reached the same conclusion. Indeed, prior to Valdez, 
Utah recognized that a Batson obj ection was untimely if it was made after the jury was sworn 
and the remainder of the venire was excused. Strict enforcement of this time requirement is 
consistent with precedent and rule and is supported by sound policy. Consequently, Part 1 
of the Valdez opinion should be reversed. 
A. The Universal Requirement that a Batson Objection Be Made 
During the Jury Selection Process. 
A Batson objection must be timely. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99-100. See also 
Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ^ 7 (citing Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 116 P.2d 653, 655 
(Utah App. 1989)). Due to the "variety of jury selection practices" in the United States, 
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however, what constitutes a timely objection is determined by each jurisdiction's procedural 
practice. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24. 
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions require a Batson objection to be made 
after the jury is selected, but before the selected trial jurors are sworn. See, e.g., Ford v. 
Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423 (1991) (calling this period "sensible"); State v. Robinson, 676 
A.2d 384, 390 (Conn. 1996); State v. Aubrey, 609 So.2d 1183,1185 (La. App. 1992). See 
also Wayne R. LaFave & JeroldH. Isreal 5 Criminal Procedure § 22.3} at 325 &n.l79 (2d 
ed. 1999) and at 90 (2003 Supp.) [hereafter Crinu Procedure]. Some jurisdictions require 
a Batson objection to be made even earlier, that is, as soon as a prima facie case of 
discriminatory intent is evident. See Crinu Procedure, id. 
Until Valdez, however, no jurisdiction permitted a Batson objection to be made after 
the jury process was completed, that is, after the trial jury is sworn and the remainder of the 
venire excused. See, e.g., Morning v. Zapata Protein (USA), Inc., 128 F.3d 213, 215 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (recognizing that requiring a Batson obj ection to be made prior to the venire being 
dismissed is a "modest and well-justified step" recognized in the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits); Garcia v. Excel Corp., 102 F.3d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1997) (directing 
trial courts to sua sponte reject & Batson objection if it is made after the venire is dismissed); 
Robinson, 676 A.2d at 390 n. 12 (citing an extensive list of jurisdictions which recognize that 
the dismissal of the venire is the outside limit for & Batson objection, but the preferred time 
is before the trial jury is sworn); State v. Ford, 2001 MT 230,39 F.3d 108,112 (Mont. 2001) 
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(citing numerous state and federal decisions which bar a Batson objection after the remainder 
of the venire is dismissed), cert denied, 537 U.S. 973 (2002). 
Moreover, until Valdez, all jurisdictions—including Utah—recognized that Batson's 
unique remedies justify strict enforcement of its timeliness requirement. If diBatson error 
is found on appeal, prejudice is presumed and reversal mandated. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 
100; Macial, 854 P.2d at 545. Consequently, quick and immediate resolution of diBatson 
objection in the trial court is essential. Indeed, Batson contemplated that its objectives could 
be achieved "without substantial disruption of the jury selection process." See Hernandez 
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358 (1991). The most effective and prompt corrective action is 
immediately reinstating any wrongfully struck juror, a remedy which can only occur if the 
Batson objection is made during the jury selection process. See McCrory v. Henderson, 82 
F.3d 1243, 1247-49 (2nd Cir. 1996) (citing an extensive list of authorities in support). 
In contrast, permitting a Batson objection after the jury selection process is completed 
undermines the policy of the contemporaneous objection rule. The contemporaneous 
objection rule requires a party to specifically and timely raise an objection so that trial court 
has a fair opportunity to correct the error and avoid reversal on appeal. See State v. 
McCardel, 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982). If a Batson objection is made after the jury 
selection process is completed, that policy is defeated. For if a violation is found only after 
the venire has been dismissed, the wrongfully struck juror cannot be reinstated. At that point, 
the only available remedy is mistrial-a remedy which is neither prompt, efficient, nor 
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corrective of the discrimination committed. See McCrory, 82 F.3d at 1247; Ford, 39 P.3d 
at 12. 
A contemporaneous objection requirement is also designed to prevent invited error. 
Cf. McCardel, 652 P.2d at 947. Allowing a Batson objection to be made after the jury 
process is completed invites error because it "permit[s] the defendant to manipulate the 
system to the extreme prejudice of the prosecution and give[s] the defendant a strong 
inducement to delay raising the objection until trial is underway." See McCory, 82 F.3d at 
1247-49 (extensively discussing the policy reasons for the strict enforcement of a timely 
objection rule in Batson cases). Accord Morning, 128 F.3d at 215 (same). 
Additionally, allowing a Batson objection to be made after the remainder of the 
venire is excused hinders a prosecutor's ability to fully explain his strikes and the trial court's 
ability to accurately assess the credibility of those explanations. If the stricken juror is in the 
courtroom when a Batson objection is made, her name can more easily be matched to her 
face and better correlated to her voir dire answers. See Aubrey, 609 So.2d at 1185-86 
(recognizing that "an obvious advantage of a prompt ruling on Batson challenges is that 
memories are fresh and a better record can be made of [ ] relevant factors [and] the neutral 
reasons for challenging the jurors") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also 
17 No. 3 Federal Litigator 71 (discussing similar reasoning adopted by the Second Circuit). 
In sum, the universal rule requiring a Batson objection to be made during the jury 
process permits prompt corrective action and prevents "costly mistrials and unnecessary 
reversals." See Morning, 128 F.2d at 215. Valdez, however, ignores this overwhelming 
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authority and sound policy. 2004 UT App 214, ^ 6-11. It claims that whatever the merits 
of a strict timely objection rule, rule 18(c)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permits a 
Batson objection to be made after the jury selection process is completed and at any point 
before trial evidence is presented. See id. at \ 11. As explained below, that holding is 
incorrect. 
B. Utah's Pre- Valdez Requirement that a Batson Objection Be 
Made During the Jury Selection Process. 
Until Valdez, Utah recognized that diBatson objection should be made during the jury 
selection process, that is, prior to the jury being sworn and the remainder of the venire 
excused. 
In Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 116 P.2d 653, 655-56 (Utah App. 1989), the Utah 
Court of Appeals fully embraced the policy behind the universal rule and refused to exempt 
a Batson objection from Utah's contemporaneous objection rule. Carlston failed to object 
during the jury selection process when the county used all of its peremptory challenges to 
remove three of four women on the jury. M a t 654. Trial was completed the same day. Id. 
Two weeks later, Carlston filed a motion for new trial in which she claimed the county had 
exercised its peremptory strikes with discriminatory intent. Id. The trial court denied the 
motion. Id. 
On appeal, the court of appeals held that Carlston waived consideration of her Batson 
claim because she failed to timely object to the county's peremptory strikes. Carlston, 776 
P.2d at 655. Carlston noted that for an objection to be timely, it must be "presented to the 
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trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." Id. In the Batson context, this 
means before the trial jury is sworn and the remainder of the venire excused. Id. at 656. 
Carlston recognized that if Batson objections were delayed beyond the jury selection 
process, a defendant would be encouraged to "'sandbag['] the prosecution by waiting until 
trial has concluded unsatisfactorily before insisting on an explanation for jury strikes that by 
then the prosecutor may largely have forgotten." Id. (quoting United States v. Forbes, 816 
F.2d 1006,1011 (5th Cir. 1987)). Carlston further recognized that a Batson objection made 
during the jury selection process permits the trial court to easily remedy a discriminatory 
strike "' simply by seating the wrongfully struck venireperson. After trial, the only remedy 
is setting aside the conviction.'" Id. (quoting Forbes, id). Allowing a Batson objection to 
be made after the venire is excused also adversely impacts the validity of the Batson ruling. 
If the remainder of the venire is no longer in the courtroom, the accused attorney is hindered 
in his ability to provide a full factual explanation for his strike and the trial court is hindered 
in its ability to fully assess the credibility of that explanation and enter informed findings. 
Id. at 656. 
Valdez acknowledges Carlston, but minimizes its significance by referring to its 
contemporaneous objection rule as "dicta." See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, ^ J 8. Carlston's 
time limitation for a Batson objection (before the jury is sworn and the remainder of the 
venire is excused) is not, however, advisory. To the contrary, Carlston recognized the 
"universal" rule requiring a Batson objection to be made during the jury selection process, 
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discussed the sound policy behind the rule, and then applied it to waive consideration of the 
merits of Carlston's Batson's objection. See Carlston, 776 P.2d at 655-56. 
Though this Court has not specifically addressed the time frame for a Batson 
objection, it has concluded that, in general, discriminatory jury selection claims must be 
raised before the jury is sworn. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16(1) (West 2004) directs that any allegation that a jury was 
selected in violation of the Jury Selection Act must be raised as soon as discovered, but "in 
any event before the trial jury is sworn.59 See Add. C. Section 78-46-16 does not govern 
constitutionally-based challenges, such as Batson. See State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 574 
n. 115 (Utah 1987). Nevertheless, this Court has applied the statute's time limitation to both 
statutory and constitutionally-based jury discrimination claims. 
Prior to Tillman, this Court relied on section 78-46-16 in holding that a fair cross-
section claim "must be lodged before the jury is sworn." State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 
217 (Utah 1986). After Tillman, this Court likewise held that a constitutionally-based 
challenge based on jury disproportionality was timely because it was raised as soon as the 
grounds for the challenge became apparent and before the jury was sworn. Redd v. Negley, 
785 P.2d 1098,1099-1100 (Utah 1989). Finally, in State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 337 (Utah 
1991), the State conceded on appeal that Span's Batson objection was timely because it was 
"made immediately after the peremptory challenges to the jurors were completed and before 
the jury was sworn." This Court summarily accepted that concession as consistent with the 
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time frames recognized in Bankhead, section 78-48-16, and rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Span, 819 P.2d at 337. 
Here, the court of appeals relied exclusively on rule 18 to find defendant's Batson 
objection timely. See Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, <[  11. While rule 18 is consistent with the 
universal time limitation fox & Batson objection, the rule is not controlling. 
Rule 18 governs the jury selection process in criminal cases. Subsection (c)(2) of the 
rule states: 
A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A 
challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn to 
try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after 
the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented . . . 
See Add, C. By its plain language, rule 18(c)(2) imposes the time limit for challenging the 
retention of a juror. The rule does not, however, control an objection to the removal of a 
juror. Nevertheless, like section 78-46-16, rule 18(c)(2)'s time frame—before the jury is 
sworn—is consistent with the universally-recognized time period for a Batson objection 
adopted in Carlston, 
Rule 18(c)(2) recognizes a good cause exception to its time requirement. A party, 
who fails to timely challenge an individual juror, may challenge that juror up until the trial 
evidence is presented, if the party establishes good cause for its delayed objection. See Add, 
C, In other words, the rule permits a party to challenge the retention of a selected juror up 
until the evidentiary stage of a trial, if the party establishes good cause for its failure to raise 
a challenge for-cause or to peremptorily strike the juror during the selection process. See 
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Rule 18(c) (Add. C). Despite the limited scope of rule 18(c)(2), the court of appeals in this 
case erroneously concludes that rule 18!s good cause exception permits consideration of 
defendant's otherwise untimely Batson challenge. See Valdez, 2004 UT App f^ 10. 
Valdez cites State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App.), cert denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991), in support of its good cause analysis. In Harrison, a Batson objection was 
made "immediately after the jury was sworn in, before the challenged jurors were excused 
from service, and before opening statements of counsel," that is, during a time period when 
an improperly struck juror could be easily reinstated. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 776 
(emphasis added). The Harrison panel concluded that section 78-36-16rs time period was 
not controlling. Id. at 776 (citing Tillman, 750 P.2d at 574 n.115). Sua sponte, the panel 
then considered rule 18fs time frame and summarily concluded that though Harrison's 
objection was untimely (made after the jury was swom), its merits could nevertheless be 
considered pursuant to rule 18fs good cause exception because it was made "before the 
challenged jurors were excused from service" and before any trial evidence was presented. 
Id. at 776. 
In applying rule 18 to a Batson objection, Harrison did not acknowledge Carlston 
or any other Batson-b&szd authority. Nevertheless, because the remainder of the venire was 
still in the courtroom and had not been dismissed when Harrison made his Batson objection, 
the Harrison decision does not contradict the universal rule and Carlston's time limitation. 
Valdez fails to recognize this distinction. Instead, Valdez concludes that Harrison and 
rule 18 permit a Batson objection to be made "before any of the evidence is presented," 
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regardless of whether the trial jury was sworn and the remainder of the venire dismissed. See 
2004 UT App 214, ^ j 11. No Utah case or decision from any other jurisdiction has gone this 
far in permitting a Batson objection. See discussion, supra. 
Contrary to Valdez, the time requirement recognized in Carlston—before the jury is 
sworn and the venire dismissed—is not a new rule or a modification of rule 18. See Valdez, 
2004 UT App 214, f 11. Over twenty years of jurisprudence establishes that a Batson 
objection must be timely raised or waived and that, in the context of Batson and Utah 
procedure, a timely Batson objection is one made during the jury selection process, that is, 
before the jury is sworn. But even if good cause permits extension of this period, the 
objection must still be made during the jury selection process, that is, at the outside, before 
the remainder of the venire is excused. 
C. Valdez's Erroneous Conclusion that Good Cause Excused 
Defendant's Untimely Batson Objection. 
Even assuming arguendo rule 18 and its good cause exception controlled Batson 
objections, here no good cause excused defendant's untimely objection. See In re Rights to 
the Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, \ 43, 515 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (recognizing that "[g]ood 
cause occurs when special circumstances essentially beyond a party's control excuse the late" 
action and "justify suspending a strict application of a [ ] deadline"). 
In this case, it was self-evident that the prosecutor used all his peremptory strikes 
against women (R. 94). Yet, defendant made no objection when the strikes were made, made 
no objection when the selectedjurors were announced, made no objection when the trial jury 
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was sworn, made no objection when the remainder of the venire was dismissed, made no 
objection when the sworn jurors were excused for lunch, and made no objection during a 
subsequent in-chambers conference until the court casually asked the parties if there was 
anything else to discuss before they recessed for lunch (R209: 78) (Add. D). Only then did 
defendant summarily raise a Batson objection (id.). See Point II And when the prosecutor 
responded that the Batson objection was not timely, defendant did not claim that it was 
timely or that good cause justified its untimeliness. He simply remained silent (R209:78-80) 
(Add. D). The trial court then asked the prosecutor, "Well not withstanding that, can you 
give me a basis to rebut the Batson type challenge?" (R209: 79). 
Contrary to Valdez, the trial court's question does not constitute an implicit finding 
of good cause. See 2004 UT App 214, f^ 10. The request simply suggests that despite the 
untimeliness of defendant's objection, the trial court believed it was best to make a record 
of the merits. Accord State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450,458 n.8 (Utah 1994) (noting trial court 
considered the merits of the Batson claim as a cautionary measure and to "complete [the] 
record"). 
Even if the trial court's question is viewed as an implicit finding of good cause, such 
a finding would constitute an abuse of discretion here because defendant did not claim that 
good cause excused his untimely objection and good cause is not otherwise apparent on the 
record. Compare Garcia, 102 F.3d at 759 (concluding that sound policy bars appellate 
review of an untimely objection, even when the trial court considers its merits), Richardson 
v. McGriff, 762 A.2d 48,63-64 (Md. App. 2000) (recognizing that substantial policy reasons 
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bar appellate consideration of a Batson objection made after the jury is sworn and venire 
dismissed, even when the trial court fully considers the merits), with State v. Belgard, 830 
P.2d 264,266 (Utah 1992) (finding no policy concerns barred appellate consideration of an 
untimely motion to suppress, which was fully considered in an evidentiary hearing below); 
and State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1160 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that when the merits 
of an evidentiary ruling are considered in a post-verdict hearing, the only policy concern is 
whether the trial court had an adequate opportunity to fully review the claim). 
Defense counsel's statement, "I noticed that when we were doing the jury selection 
that the State struck all women . . . " (R209: 78), suggests that he was fully aware of the 
suspect pattern of strikes during jury selection, but waited to raise his Batson claim until after 
the remainder of the venire was excused. At that point, no prompt corrective action could 
be taken, even if the trial court had found a violation. The only remedy was mistrial—or 
given Batson *s automatic reversal rule, the possibility of reversal on appeal. See Carlston, 
776 P.2d at 656 (recognizing that a delayed Batson objection allows a defendant to 
"sandbag" the prosecution). See also McCrory, 82 F.3d at 1247 (recognizing that a delayed 
Batson objection permits a defendant to "manipulate the system to the extreme prejudice of 
the prosecution" by planting automatic reversal error). 
In sum, defendant's Batsorfs objection was untimely and consideration of its merits 
waived. This Court should reverse Part I of the Valdez opinion, vacate Parts II-IV of the 
opinion as dicta, reinstate defendant's convictions, and remand to the court of appeals for 
consideration only of defendant's remaining evidentiary claim (admission of B WS evidence). 
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POINTII 
VALDEZ FAILED TO APPLY THE BATSON STANDARDS AND 
ANALYSIS ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT AND THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 
Should this Court conclude that defendant's Batson objection was untimely and 
consideration of its merits waived, see Point I it should nevertheless clarify what constitutes 
proper Batson analysis and standards and vacate Parts II-IV of the Valdez opinion. See 
Span, 819 P.2d at 340 (clarifying Batson'§ "cognizable minority group" requirement, even 
though the issue was not determinative of the outcome of the appeal). If defendant's 
objection is timely and its merits fully reviewed, this Court should reverse Parts II-IV of the 
Valdez opinion, affirm the trial court's finding of no discriminatory intent, and reinstate 
defendant's convictions. In either case, the appeal should then be remanded to the court of 
appeals for determination of defendant's remaining evidentiary claim (BWS evidence). 
Valdez confuses and contradicts established Batson law. Valdez fails to consider the 
merits of the trial court's ultimate finding of no discriminatory intent. See 2004 UT App 
214, Tf 17 n.2. It also fails to apply established standards of review, impermissibly combines 
distinct analytical steps, and erroneously equates a non-discriminatory explanation for a 
peremptory strike with the bias requirement of a for-cause challenge. See id. at ^ 13, 17, 
21-25 & 29. The flawed analysis in Valdez inevitably leads to its erroneous conclusion that 
the trial court abused its discretion in not "outright" rejecting the prosecutor's explanations 
for his strikes. See id. at ^ 30-31. 
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A. Batson's Incorporation of General Equal Protection Analysis. 
Batson is based on "the general equal protection principle that the 'invidious quality' 
of governmental action claimed to be [ ] discriminatory 'must ultimately be traced to a [ ] 
discriminatory purpose.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229 (1976)). Batson'§ three step analytical procedure is identical to that found in 
employment discrimination cases. Compare Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-98, with Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-58 (1985) (cited with 
approval in Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n. 18 & 98 n.20). Compare also Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ffi| 
18-22, with University of Utah v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 736 P.2d 630, 634-65 
(Utah 1987); aw/ Shekh v. Department of Public Safety, 90>4P.2d 110351105-1106 (Utah 
App. 1995). 
Consequently, in a Batson case, "[a]s in any equal protection case, the burden is, of 
course, on the defendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire to prove the 
existence of purposeful discrimination." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Defendant, as the party 
alleging discrimination, must initially make a prima facie showing that the strike was made 
for a discriminatory purpose (step one). This requires, as it does in any equal protection case, 
that defendant show that "the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 
"Once the defendant makes the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the State to 
explain adequately" the strike (step two). Batson, 476 U.S. at 94. See also Burdine, 450 
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U.S. at 253. More than a general denial is required: "[T]he State must demonstrate that 
permissible [ ] neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic 
result." Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. If a neutral explanation is provided, the trial court must 
evaluate the explanation and determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, if 
defendant has carried his burden of establishing purposeful discrimination (step three). 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Accord J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 
144.45; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547. 
Batson's analytical steps—and Valdez's errors in interpreting and applying them—are 
more fully discussed below. 
B. Step One: The Prima Facie Showing. 
Batson's first step requires the opponent of a peremptory strike (here defendant) to 
make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised the strike with purposeful 
discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 Step one's purpose is to eliminate "the most 
common nondiscriminatory reasons" for a strike. See Burdine, 450 U. S. at 254. In other 
words, the prima facie showing separates "meritless claims of discrimination from those that 
have merit." Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 455 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
To establish a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, defendant must 
demonstrate that the totality of the relevant facts surrounding the challenged strike gives rise 
to an inference of discriminatory purpose. See Batson, A16 U.S. at 93-94; J.E.B., 511 U.S. 
at 144-45; Colwell, 2000 UT 8, \ 18; Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 455. That is, if the facts alleged 
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by defendant are believed, they are sufficient to support a finding that the strike was 
exercised solely for a discriminatory purpose. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143; Batson, 476 U.S 
at 89 & 98. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. This requires "more than simply showing 
that one or more minority jurors were peremptorily stricken." Harrison, 805 P.2d at 777. 
Accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8 4 18; Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 457-58. Instead, the prima facie 
showing must be based on "as complete a record as possible" and establish "a strong 
likelihood" that discrimination occurred.3 See Alvarez, id. 
Here, the sufficiency of defendant's prima facie showing is not at issue because the 
prosecutor did not challenge it below (R209: 79-80). See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359; 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8 4 18; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547. See also Valdez, 2004 UT App 
2 1 4 4 20. Nevertheless, Valdez commits err in its step one analysis. 
Valdez fails to recognize that the weakness or strength of the prima facie showing, 
even when not challenged in step one, remains relevant for step three. See 2004 UT App 
2 1 4 4 20. In step three, the trial court must consider all relevant facts—including the 
weakness or strength of the prima facie showing—in determining whether defendant has 
carried his burden to prove that the strike was exercised solely for a discriminatory purpose. 
See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369-70. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56; University of 
Utah, 736 P.2d at 6334-35. 
3In employment discrimination cases, the prima facie showing must be established 
by a preponderance of the evidence. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; University of 
Utah, 736 P.2d at 635. 
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Here, defendant's prima facie showing, though uncontested, was weak. Defendant 
claimed only that the prosecutor used four of four (100%) peremptory strikes against women 
(R209: 78). The figure is meaningless without context. See Colwell, 2000 UT 8, If 18; 
Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 455-58; State v. Shepard, 1999 UT App 305,130, 989 P.2d 503. 
The original venire originally consisted of 25 people, 14 of whom were women (14/25 
or 56%). Three women were removed for cause—one over the objection of the prosecutor 
(R. 94; R209: 66-69). The prosecutor used four peremptory challenges (4/4 or 100%) to 
remove four of the remaining eleven women from the jury (4/11 or 36%) (id.). Defendant, 
in turn, used four peremptory challenges (4/4 or 100%) to remove four of eight men (4/8 or 
50%) (id.). The selected jury consisted of four men (50%) and four women (50%) (id.). 
Consequently, though the prosecutor used 100% of his strikes against women, the strikes 
only reduced the percentage of women jurors from 56% of the original venire to 50% of the 
selected jury. This modest change in the overall composition of the jury does not alone 
establish evidence of discriminatory intent. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 777. See also 5 Crinu 
Proc. at 326-27 (noting that a prima facie case is rarely established where the percentage of 
jurors alleged to be improperly struck is less than the percentage of the group remaining on 
the jury). But see State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 464 (Utah App.) (recognizing that "the 
improper dismissal of even one venireman is intolerable"), cert denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 
1993). 
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In sum, in this case, the prosecutor waived any objection to the sufficiency of the 
primary showing. Nevertheless, the strength or weakness of defendant's prima facie showing 
remains relevant to the ultimate Batson inquiry. 
C. Step Two: The Neutral Explanation. 
Once a prima showing is made, the proponent of the strike (here the prosecutor) must 
provide a facially neutral explanation for the challenged strike (step two). See Purkett, 514 
U.S. at768;/.£'.£., 511 U.S. at 144-45; Batson, 476 U.S. at91-98;Higginbotham, 917P.2d 
at 548. The explanation must raise a "genuine issue of fact" as to whether the challenged 
strike was exercised with discriminatory intent. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. See also 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69. In this way, step two's explanation frames the factual issue 
which will ultimately be resolved by the trial court in step three. See Bur dine, 450 U.S. at 
255. 
Step two is purely a matter of production. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767. The 
prosecutor must provide "an explanation based on something other that the race [or gender] 
of a juror." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. As with any peremptory strike, the reason should 
be "related to [the prosecutor's] view concerning the outcome of the case to be tried." 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. But because the explanation must create a "genuine issue of fact," 
a general denial of discriminatory purpose is insufficient. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
Instead, the prosecutor's "explanation of [his] legitimate reasons must be clear and 
reasonably specific." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258 (quoted with approval in Batson, 476 U.S. 
at 98 n.20, and Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768). In step two, however, the explanation need not be 
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persuasive or even plausible. SeePurkett, 514 U.S. at 768; Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Instead, 
the credibility and validity of the explanation are the exclusive province of step three (the 
trial court's ultimate determination), where 
implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be 
pretexts for purposeful discrimination. But to say that a trial judge may choose 
to disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at step three is quite different from 
saying that a trial judge must terminate the inquiry at step two when the [ ] 
neutral reason is silly or superstitions. The latter violates the principle that the 
ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests and 
never shifts from the opponent of the strike. 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 (emphasis in original). Accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 22; 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. "Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the 
prosecutor's explanation, the reason will be deemed [] neutral." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769. 
"Placing this burden of production on [the prosecutor] thus serves simultaneously to 
meet the [defendant's] prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and 
to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the [defendant] will have a full and 
fair oppor tunity to demonstrate pretext." Burdine, at 255. Once a facially neutral 
explanation is given, the burden shifts back to defendant to proved that the prosecutor's 
reasons "were not [his] true reasons, but rather a pretext for discrimination." See University 
of Utah, 736 P.2d at 635. This "allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption by 
the establishment of a prima facie case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into 
the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8. 
AccordPurkett, 514 U.S. at 767-69. 
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(1) Requirements for a Neutral Explanation. 
Contrary to the authorities discussed above, Valdez holds that step two requires that 
the prosecutor's explanation be "(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and 
reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate." See 2004 UT App 214, 1| 21 (quoting State v. 
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,T|9,41 P.3d 1153). The court of appeals erroneously treats these 
components as factors to be weighed by the trial court, whereas they are simply general 
descriptions of the type of explanation needed.4 Compare Valdez at |^ 21-25 & 27, with 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69, and Bur dine, 450 U.S. at 255-58. Indeed, Batson used the 
terms "clear" and "legitimate," not as weighed factors, but simply to "refute the notion that 
a prosecutor could satisfy his burden of production by merely denying that he had a 
discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769. 
In effect, Valdez impermissibly grafts step three factors onto step two. See discussion 
of step three, infra. This is the very error condemned by the United States Supreme Court 
in Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-69, and Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-58, and by this Court in 
University of Utah, 736 P.2d at 634-35. Both Courts made clear that in an equal protection 
claim, the proponent of the challenged action "need only produce [ ] evidence which would 
allow the [court] rationally to conclude that the [challenged] decision had not been motivated 
by discriminatory animus." See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257. See also Hernandez, 500 U.S. 
at 359 (recognizing that a "discriminatory purpose . . . implies that the decisionmaker 
4This error is not unique to Valdez, but occurs in other court of appeals decisions. 
See, e.g., Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, f 9; State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, ^  7, 58 
P.3d 867, cert, denied, 67 P.3d 495 (Utah 2003). 
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selected a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
In other words, the prosecutor's burden of production in step two is satisfied if he "simply 
explains what he has done or produces evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons" 
for his strikes. SeeBurdine, 450 U.S. at 256-57 (in context of employment discrimination). 
In Valdez, the court of appeals recognizes that the prosecutor's explanations are 
facially neutral, but then rejects them because they are "hardly clear, concise, or reasonably 
specific... [and] offered nothing more than vague and generic descriptions of the jurors that 
anyone could concede are nondiscriminatory, but which do not appear to have anything to 
do with the jurors themselves." 2004 UT App 214, ^ 27-29. As will be discussed, this 
assessment is erroneous. 
(2) The Neutrality of the Explanations in This Case. 
Contrary to Valdez, the record establishes that the prosecutor's explanations were 
reasonably specific, clear, and non-discriminatory. See 2004 UT App 214, Iff 26-29. They 
were, therefore, adequate to meet step 2's burden of production. 
The prosecutor struck Valerio based on her employment in a non-profit agency (R209: 
14-16, 79). He struck Gonzalez based on her claimed prior knowledge of the case (R209: 
18-19, 65-66, 79). He struck Morley because he believed that her job, like Valerio's, might 
render her overly compassionate and because the next juror had experiences and training, 
which the prosecutor preferred (R209: 27-30, 45-46, 79-80). None of the explanations 
implicated gender and, consequently, none were inherently discriminatory. See, e.g., 
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Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 370; United States v. Moreno, 878 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 498 U.S. 924 (1999); Macial, 854 P.2d at 546-47; State v. Williams, 545 So.2d 651, 
653-54 (La. App. 1989) (all upholding the neutrality of strikes based on a juror's appearance, 
demeanor, reactions, or attitudes). See also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142 n. 14 & 143 n. 16; United 
States v. Johnson, 905 F.2d 222, 223 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 979 (1989); United 
States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 114 (1989) (all 
upholding the neutrality of strikes based on a juror's employment, occupation, military 
affiliation, or other associations). See 5 Crinu Procedure at 329-33 (main text) & at 94-95 
(supp.). 
The prosecutor struck Thornton based on her prior jury service and the presumptively 
reduced verdict of manslaughter she had returned in that case (R209: 14, 34, 49-50, 79). 
According to Valdez, the prosecutor's explanation is "unrelated to the case at hand." 2004 
UT App 214, f^ 28. The court asserts that "manslaughter has nothing to do with the present 
case" and that Thornton's participation in another criminal case "does not undermine her 
ability to be impartial in the present case." Id. This misinterprets the requirement of 
specificity in step two. Regardless of the nature of the cases involved, prior jury service is 
a facially neutral and ultimately legitimate reason to strike a juror. See 5 Crinu Procedure 
at 328-34. See also United States v. Contreras-Contreras, 83 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 
1995). Additionally, the non-discriminatory explanation for a peremptory strike does not 
need to "rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." See Colwell, 2000 UT 
8, K 22. See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-89 (same). 
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In sum, Valdez erred in rejecting the prosecutor's non-discriminatory explanations 
"outright" and in failing to advance to step three of its Batson analysis.5 
D. Step Three: The Factual Finding of Discriminatory Intent. 
Step three of Batson analysis requires the trial court to determine if defendant has 
proven purposeful discrimination, i.e., that the prosecutor exercised the challenged strike 
solely for a discriminatory reason. See Batson, 416 U.S. at 98; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 
548. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-58. In this final step, the trial court must determine 
if the prosecutor's "explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed." See 
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. Even in step three, however, the issue is not whether the 
explanation is in fact true, but whether the reason given for the strike is a pretext to disguise 
an impermissible discriminatory motive. See Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549 n.3. 
Consequently, even if the prosecutor is mistaken in fact in his explanation, defendant cannot 
prevail in his Batson objection unless he establishes that the prosecutor's motive was in fact 
discriminatory. See Higginbotham, id. 
5
 Valdez may erred in applying an abuse of discretion standard for steps one and 
two. See 2004 UT App 214, ^ 14-17. Viewing the two steps as "reciprocals," the court 
adopted the standard based on Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 456 (reviewing step one for abuse of 
discretion). See 2004 UT App 214, ^ 15 & 17. The standard is questionable, however, 
because a prima facie showing is normally treated as a question of law. See Bair v. 
Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20, Tf 13, 20 P.3d 388. Similarly, whether an explanation is 
inherently discriminatory is viewed as a question of law. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 
359; State v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 273, f 15, 76 P.3d 188. 
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Only in step three does "the persuasiveness of the [prosecutor's] justification become 
[ ] relevant." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. In step two, an implausible, but facially non-
discriminatory reasons is sufficient because the prosecutor bears no burden of persuasion. 
Id. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257-58. In step three, however, "implausible or fantastic 
justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination." 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. AccordColwell, 2000 UT 8, \22; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. 
In step three, the trial judge must "undertake a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. 
The "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the exercise of the peremptory strikes should 
also be considered. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363. Factors that may bear on the validity 
and credibility of the explanation include: "(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by 
the juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory examination assuming 
neither the trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror 
out for special questioning designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the prosecutor's reason 
is unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally applicable 
to juror[s] who were not challenged." State v. Cantu, 788 P.2d 517, 518-19 (Utah 1989). 
Often, however, the trial court's assessment may be based on "little evidence" other than the 
credibility of the prosecutor. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.322,340 (2003) (reaffirming 
that "[t]he credibility of the prosecutor's explanation goes to the heart of the equal protection 
analysis [and] once that had been settled, there seems nothing left [for an appellate] court to 
review"). 
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Valdez never reviewed the trial court's finding of no discriminatory intent (step three) 
because it prematurely terminated its analysis with step two. See 2002 UT App 214, ^  17 n.2. 
If Valdezhad proceeded to step three, it would had been obligated to defer to the trial court's 
ruling unless clearly erroneous. See Colwell, 2000 UT 8, \ 20. Here, the trial court's 
ultimate finding of no discriminatory intent is fully supported by the record and, 
consequently, entitled to affirmance on appeal. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369 
(recognizing that "[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's 
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous") (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
By the time defendant made his Batson objection, the jury process was completed. 
The stricken jurors had been excused and were no longer in the courtroom (R209:70,78-80). 
The prosecutor and the trial court, therefore, had to rely primarily on their memories of the 
venire and the voir dire examination. The prosecutor had some notes, but he found several 
unreadable (R209: 80). Additionally, due to the delay, the prosecutor no longer remembered 
every detail of the four jurors or their responses in voir dire (R209: 79-80).6 Nevertheless, 
he clearly remembered his primary reasons for striking them. He struck Valerio because he 
felt her employment might make her "overly compassionate." He struck Gonzalez because 
he did not like the tone and manner of her responses regarding her knowledge of the case. 
6
 He could not remember Thornton's specific pretrial knowledge of the case 
(R209: 79). He also did not remember that Morley was a Title-I teacher's aide in addition 
to a piano teacher (R209: 80). He may have been confused about what magazines Morley 
read (R209: 79). 
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He struck Thornton because she had previously served on a jury, which had returned a 
verdict of manslaughter. He struck Morley because he felt her employment, like Valerio's, 
would make her more inclined to "let bygones be bygones;" he also preferred the next juror 
who was a Vietnam veteran, hunter, and familiar with firearms. See R209: 79-80 (Add. D). 
The prosecutor's reasons related to facts gleaned through voir dire. The reasons were 
unique to the stricken jurors and did not apply to the seated jurors. None of the seated jurors 
were employed by a nonprofit agency, taught school under a Title-I grant, or taught piano at 
home as did stricken jurors Valerio and Morley. Only one member of the seated jury (Curtis) 
had heard of the case (R. 94; R209: 34-35, 61-62). But unlike stricken juror Gonzalez who 
related incorrect information, Curtis's information was correct. And unlike Gonzalez, who 
only "thought" she could set aside outside information, Curtis viewed herself as a 
"professional" and said she would "absolutely" judge the case only on the trial evidence 
(R209: 60-61). None of the seated jurors had previously served on a jury and none had 
rendered a reduced verdict in a criminal case, both of which Thornton had. See Add. E. 
The trial court found the prosecutor's explanations reasonably specific, legitimate, and 
credible (R209: 80). See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,787 n.6 (Utah 1991) (recognizing 
facts implicit in the lower court's ruling). This finding was reasonable in light of the 
weakness of defendant's prima facie showing, the detail and candor of the prosecutor's 
explanations, the prosecutor's objection to the removal of one woman juror for cause (R209: 
66-69), and the trial court's first-hand observations of the jurors and their responses in voir 
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dire. It was reasonable in light of defendant's failure to challenge the prosecutor's stated 
reasons for the strike. 
Defendant's failure to attack the prosecutor's explanations below waives his right to 
challenge the validity of those explanations for the first time on appeal. See Carlston, 776 
P.2d at 655. Valdez disagrees and holds that defendant has no duty to "renew" his Batson 
objection beyond his initial objection by further objecting once the prosecutor provided his 
explanations for the strikes. See 2004 UT App 214, \ 13. This is incorrect. Once a neutral 
explanation is tendered, defendant, as the party claiming discriminatory intent, bears the 
burden of ultimately rebutting the explanation by disproving its validity. See Burdine, 450 
U.S. at 255-56; University of Utah, 736 P.2d at 625. See also 5 Crim. Procedure at 329 
(citing cases holding that a defendant must attack the prosecutor's explanation); State v. 
Owen, 935 P.2d 183,196 (Idaho App. 1997) (reflisingto consider whether explanations were 
pretextual where defendant did not attack them below). 
Sound policy supports this requirement. Jury selection is subjective and the reasons 
for striking a juror are highly personal. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, fflf 20-21, 12 
P.3d 92 (recognizing that jury selection "more art than science"). Yet, if&Batson objection 
is successful in the trial court, it will result in the immediate reinstatement of the improperly 
struck juror or the possible replacement of the entire venire. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 
n.24. Even when a party suspects an opponent's strike, he may opt not to raise a Batson 
objection if he does not want the stricken juror to be reinstated or is otherwise satisfied with 
the jury venire. See Litherland, id. Similarly, a party may initially raise a Batson obj ection, 
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as defendant did here, but then choose to abandon it once the prosecutor provides obviously 
neutral explanations for the strike. Id. 
In this case, defendant's silence after the prosecutor explained the strikes reasonably 
suggests his acceptance of the explanations' neutrality. Valdez, 2004 UT App 214, f 13, 
erred in considering defendant's challenge to those explanations for the first time on appeal. 
See McCardel, 652 P.2d at 947 (recognizing that a failure to object below waives 
consideration of the merits of an issue). 
In sum, defendant failed to carry his burden of proving discriminatory intent and, 
consequently, his Batson objection was properly denied by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Valdez should be reversed, defendant's convictions should be 
reinstated, and the case remanded to the court of appeals with directions to review only 
defendant's remaining evidentiary claim concerning the admissibility of Battered Woman 
Syndrome evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //<#bday of March, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney GeneraT^^ 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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[25] Jury <£^33(5 15) 
230k33(5 15) 
Unless the neutral explanation offered by the state 
for a peremptory strike may, on its face, be tied to 
the issues, evidence, and context of the case at hand, 
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OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge 
**1 Anthony James Valdez appeals convictions for 
aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-203 
(2002), possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a second-degree felony, m 
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-10-
503(2)(a) (2002), and criminal mischief, a class B 
misdemeanor, m violation of Utah Code Annotated 
section 76-6-106 (2002) We reverse and remand 
BACKGROUND 
**2 Valdez was prosecuted for various domestic 
violence charges, including the violent crimes listed 
above On October 29, 2002, the district court 
conducted voir dire to select a jury for Valdez's 
trial Following the jury selection, Valdez objected 
to the State's use of its peremptory challenges under 
Batson v Kentucky, 476 U S 79, 106 S Ct 1712, 
90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986) In order to demonstrate a 
prima facie case of discrimination under Batson, 
Valdez s counsel noted that the State used all four of 
its peremptory challenges to exclude women from 
the jury Valdez further noted that in a domestic 
violence jury trial, gender issues tend to be highly 
charged Ultimately, he argued, the State's 
exclusion of only women from the jury cannot be 
disregarded, on its face, in the context of this case 
**3 The State did not argue that Valdez had failed 
to present a prima facie case of discrimination, but 
instead argued Valdez's Batson challenge was 
untimely Without addressing the timeliness of 
Valdez's challenge, the district court ordered the 
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State to explain its challenges The State explained 
its challenges as follows 
[T]he State chose to strike Ms Valeno because 
she stated that she worked for a nonprofit bram 
injury type of place That is not a basis upon 
which to strike her [for cause], but I felt her 
responses lined up m a way that would make her 
not a helpful [juror] for the State and that she 
would be somewhat overly compassionate 
The second [juror] was Ms Gonzalez She had 
heard of the case and seemed— though she said 
that it wouldn't bother her, her responses to me 
seemed matter of fact and I felt like her responses 
would not make her a good juror for the State 
Ms Thornton had also heard of the case and I 
don't recall what it was, there was something that 
I immediately decided that I would make her one 
of my strikes She'd also been on a jury and he 
was found guilty of a manslaughter, which I 
thought was probably a one-step reduction, at least 
that's the assumption So again, I felt like she was 
not going to be a helpful one for the State 
The last one I agonized over whether to strike, 
No 19, Paul[a] Morely or 21 Ron Hardy, I 
conferred with my colleague, *295 and we 
talked about it and she brought to my attention he 
was a hunter and that she felt like a hunter would 
know things about guns and brought that point 
about that potential juror and another one And 
after conferring with her I changed my mind and 
went with [her]-and that was simply—she was 
simply towards the end I suppose there was also 
it felt like she was not strong, not-I'm sorry, I'm 
trying to read my notes here 
There was this pattern of-her responses made me 
think she would be somebody, again, that might be 
willing to let bygones be bygones, what I would 
say overly compassionate, and it was just based on 
her responses about position, her responses to 
little subtle things like her teaching piano lessons 
and the magazines she chose We don't have a lot 
to base these things on, so that's how I made those 
choices 
(First alteration m original) Ultimately, the 
district court accepted the State's explanations and 
overruled Valdez's objection 
**4 During the jury trial, the victim recanted her 
accusation against Valdez The State called an 
expert m Battered Women Syndrom (BWS) to 
explain why many victims of abuse recant their 
accusation against their abuser Valdez objected to 
the testimony, but the district court overruled the 
objection The jury found Valdez guilty of 
aggravated burglary, possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, and criminal 
mischief Valdez appeals 
ANALYSIS 
**5 Valdez challenges the district court's ruling 
that the State offered nondiscriminatory reasons for 
its use of peremptory stnfc es 
I Procedural Issues 
**6 As a preliminary matter, the State raises two 
threshold procedural issues that, according to the 
State, bar appellate review of Valdez's challenges 
A Timeliness 
[1][2][3][4] **7 First, the State contends Valdez 
did not raise his Batson challenge in a timely 
manner Under Batson, a challenge to a peremptory 
strike must be timely See Batson v Kentucky, 476 
U S 79, 99- 100, 106 S Ct 1712, 1724-25, 90 
L Ed 2d 69 (1986) (allowing for local timeliness 
rules to bar Batson challenges), Salt Lake County v 
Carlston, 116 P 2d 653 655 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
(stating, in context of Batson challenge, "[i]t is 
axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue 
on appeal, the record must clearly show that it was 
timely presented to the trial court m a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon") "Issues not 
raised in the trial court m timely fashion are deemed 
waived, precluding this court from considering their 
merits on appeal " Carlston, 776 P 2d at 655 
What constitutes a timely challenge under Batson 
depends entirely upon local procedures, see id, 
Fordv Georgia, 498 U S 411, 423, 111 S Ct 850, 
857, 112 L E d 2 d 935 (1991), but only " 'firmly 
established and regularly followed state [procedure]' 
may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent 
[appellate] review" of this important constitutional 
claim Id at 423-24, 111 S Ct at 857 (citation 
omitted) 
**8 Valdez waited to raise his Batson challenge 
until after the venire had been dismissed, the jury 
had been sworn in, and the court preliminarily 
instructed the jury The State refers us to several 
other jurisdictions that require a Batson challenge to 
be raised no later than "m the period between the 
selection of the jurors and the administration of their 
oaths " Id at 422, 111 S Ct at 857, see also 
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Carlston, 116 P 2d at 655-56 (citing favorably, in 
dicta, several jurisdictions that require Bats on 
challenge to be raised prior to dismissing venire) 
The reason for barring a Batson challenge after the 
jury is sworn m has been variously stated as 
follows 
The "timely objection" rule is designed to prevent 
defendants from "sandbagging" the prosecution by 
waiting until trial has concluded unsatisfactorily 
before insisting on an explanation for jury strikes 
that by then the prosecutor may largely have 
forgotten Furthermore, prosecutorial misconduct 
is easily remedied prior to commencement of trial 
simply by seating the wrongfully struck 
venireperson After trial, the only remedy is 
setting aside the conviction 
*296 Id at 656 (citations omitted), see also 
People v Holder, 153 111 App 3d 884, 106 111 Dec 
700, 506 N E 2 d 407, 408 (1987) (stating waiver 
rule enforced "so as not to allow a defendant to 
object to that which he has acquiesced m" 
throughout trial) 
**9 Furthermore, the State argues, this rule is 
consistent with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
18(c)(2), which provides "[a] challenge to an 
individual juror may be made only before the jury is 
sworn except the court may, for good cause, 
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but 
before any of the evidence is presented " In State v 
Harrison, the Utah Supreme Court applied rule 18's 
good cause provision to review an untimely Batson 
challenge See 805 P 2d 769, 776 (Utah 1991) 
However, m that case the challenge was "made and 
argued immediately after the jury was sworn m, 
before the challenged jurors were excused from 
service, and before opening statements of counsel " 
Id This is significant, the State maintains, because 
once the venire and the challenged jurors have been 
dismissed, the remedy of reinstating the wrongly 
challenged juror is no longer available Thus, under 
the State s argument, Harrison represents the 
"outside limit" m Utah to timely raising a Batson 
challenge 
[5] **10 However, under Harrison, a district court 
may consider a defendant's Batson challenge beyond 
the dismissal of the venire, even if it has made no 
specific finding of good cause pursuant to rule 18 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure See 805 
P 2d at 776 So long as it "allow[s] counsel to 
proceed with their [Batson ] arguments," the district 
court impliedly finds good cause under rule 18 to 
consider the constitutional claim Id In this case, 
the district court did just that by ignoring the State's 
timeliness argument and requiring the parties to 
proceed directly to arguments on the merits Thus, 
the district court impliedly found good cause under 
rule 18 to allow a challenge to the State's 
peremptory strikes beyond the usual limits 
[6] **11 However, even if we adopted the State's 
position, we could not "mterpose[ ]" it "to prevent 
subsequent [appellate] review" m this case Ford, 
498 U S at 424, 111 S Ct at 857 The rule the 
State proposes, which would prohibit Batson 
challenges after the venire has been dismissed and 
the jury has been sworn, has not heretofore been a " 
'firmly established and regularly followed state 
[procedure] ' " Id at 423, 111 S Ct at 857 (1991) 
(citations omitted) At best, this rule could be 
gleaned by analogy and implication from Harrison 
and rule 18 However, rule 18 itself allows Batson 
challenges at a later time than the State's proposed 
rule, because it allows challenges "before any of the 
evidence is presented " Utah R Cnm P 18(c)(2) 
Thus, in the absence of any firmer and more 
established authority on the subject, we could not 
prevent appellate review of Valdez's constitutional 
claim due to lack of timeliness [FN1] 
FN1 This issue would best be addressed by an 
amendment to the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure This opinion should not be read as a 
comment, positive or negative, on the 
appropriateness of the rule the State proposes 
B Preservation 
[7][8] **12 Second, the State argues Valdez failed 
to preserve his objection to the State's explanation 
for the strikes Specifically, Valdez did not 
challenge the validity of the prosecutor's 
explanations for the strikes Consequently, the State 
argues, Valdez is precluded from attacking the 
State's explanations for the first time on appeal 
' [T]o ensure the trial court's opportunity to consider 
an issue, appellate review of criminal cases in Utah 
requires 'that a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record ' " State v 
Brown, 856 P 2d 358, 360 (Utah App 1993) 
(quoting State v Tillman, 750 P 2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)) 
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[9] **13 We are persuaded by Valdez, however, 
that his initial objection to the State's use of 
peremptory challenges to strike women from the 
jury constituted sufficient preservation of his 
constitutional claim Ford v Georgia held that an 
appellate court cannot prevent review by applying a 
"rule unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial " 
*297 498 U S 411, 424, 111 S Ct 850, 858, 112 
L Ed 2d 935 (1991) In Utah, there is no clear rule 
requiring a defendant to renew a Bats on objection or 
to object specifically to the State's offered 
explanations Rather, Utah courts do "not require a 
party to continue to object once a motion has been 
made, and the trial court has rendered a decision on 
the issue " State v Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4,^ 14, 20 
P 3d 265 Here, Valdez objected to the State's use 
of peremptory challenges, thereby preventing any 
claim that he strategically hid his objection until 
after obtaining an unsatisfactory result, which seems 
to be the State's strongest objection to Valdez's 
challenge 
II Issue and Standard of Review 
[10] **14 Valdez specifically challenges the 
district court's ruling that the State offered a 
nondiscriminatory reason for its use of peremptory 
strikes We are unaware of any cases propeily 
applying an appropriate standard of review for such 
challenges State v Chatwin appears to set forth a 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review for such 
challenges See 2002 UT App 363,1) 5, 58 P 3d 867 
"Chatwin argues that the prosecution's stated 
reason for striking the potential juror was not neutral 
and constituted illegal discrimination Absent a 
showing of clear error, we will not overturn a trial 
court's determination concerning the discriminatory 
intent embodied in a party's explanation for Ihe 
exercise of a peremptory challenge " Id To 
establish the clearly erroneous standard of review m 
the step two context, however, Chatwin cited, 
without analysis, State v Cannon, 2002 UT App L8, 
U 5, 41 P 3d 1153 That case set forth the clearly 
erroneous standard of review in the step three 
context, and is inapplicable here Chatwin went 
further, however, and decided the step two question 
as a matter of law, rather than applying the clearly 
erroneous standard it previously set forth Here, 
our decision will analyze and clarify the appropriate 
standard of review for step two challenges 
Accordingly, we must determine the appropriate 
standard of review, relying on analogy to other 
standards of review applicable in cases involving 
alleged discrimination m the voir dire process 
[11][12][13] **15 The challenge at issue involves 
the second step of a tripartite process for 
determining whether the prosecution has engaged in 
prohibited discrimination in the jury selection 
process See Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363 at j^ 7, 58 
P 3d 867 The first step of that test requires that a 
defendant challenging the prosecutor's use of a 
peremptory challenge must present a prima facie 
case of discrimination See id A trial court's 
determination that a defendant has presented a prima 
facie case of discrimination is a matter of some 
discretion on the part of the trial court, and we will 
only reverse that determination where the trial court 
has abused its discretion See State v Alvarez, 872 
P2d 450, 456 (Utah 1994) The purpose for 
allowing the trial court some discretion m 
determining whether the defendant has presented a 
prima facie case of discrimination was stated by the 
Utah Supreme Court as follows 
The abuse of discretion standard of review is 
particularly appropriate to this question [T]he 
United States Supreme Court was reluctant to 
define m detail what facts will raise an inference 
of discrimination Likewise, we have not 
articulated specific factors that amount to a "strong 
likelihood" that minority jurors were challenged 
because of their iacial or ethnic group 
membership By accoi ding discretion to the trial 
court in this area, we permit "experience to 
accumulate at the lowest court level" until we "see 
more clearly what factors are important to [the] 
decision and how to take them into account " 
See id at 456 n 3 (citations omitted) What may 
constitute a prima facie showing of discrimination in 
the context of one case may not constitute a showing 
of discrimination in the context of another case 
This is so because each case may turn on different 
issues, or even subtly different nuances Thus, we 
allow the trial court discretion in making the 
determination whether, m the context of the specific 
case, a defendant has presented a prima facie case of 
discrimination 
[14] [15] **16 The third step of the tripartite 
process for determining whether the *298 
prosecution engaged m prohibited discrimination 
during the jury selection process requires the trial 
court to weigh the evidence and ' look beyond the 
explanation, if possible, to determine whether the 
strike was purposefully discriminatory " Chatwin, 
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2002 UT App 363 at 1f 7, 58 P 3d 867 More than 
being dependant on the particular issues, 
circumstances and nuances of a particular case, this 
determination requires the trial court to delve into a 
weighing of the evidence and the credibility of the 
prosecutor See Hernandez v New York, 500 U S 
352, 365, 111 S Ct 1859, 1869, 114 L Ed 2d 395 
(1991) This is an intensely factual determination, 
see State v Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,11 13, 41 P 3d 
1153, and we thus review the trial court's factual 
findings for clear error See State v Jensen, 2003 
UT App 273,H 7, 76 P 3d 188 
**17 In our view, the issue involved here, whether 
the prosecutor offered a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the peremptory strikes, 
is closely analogous to the step one issue It seems 
less like a factual issue because the trial court does 
not weigh evidence, but instead looks to the face of 
the State's explanations See Chatwin, 2002 UT 
App 363 at K 7, 58 P 3d 867 (stating prosecutor's 
explanation "must be, at the very least, facially 
neutral" (emphasis added)) The trial court's 
examination of the facial neutrality of the State's 
explanation also considers the general context of the 
case and the specific issues mvolved, see id (stating 
prosecutor's explanation "must be related to the 
case being tried"), similar to the way the trial court 
considers whether the defendant has presented a 
prima facie case of discrimination See Alvarez, 872 
P 2d at 455-56 Indeed, the district court's 
consideration of the context of the case is an 
indispensable portion of the step two analytic 
framework, as we will discuss below Thus, steps 
one and two m the analytical process appear to be 
analytic reciprocals Accordingly, it is appropriate 
to consider this issue one of discretion with the trial 
court and to review the trial court's determination 
for abuse of that discretion [FN2] 
FN2 Because Valdez's step two challenge 
constitutes a sufficient basis to reverse, we do not 
reach his alternate step three argument Further, 
we do not reach Valdez's arguments regarding the 
admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome 
evidence within the context of this case See State 
v Heaton, 958 P 2d 911, 919 (Utah 1998) 
(holding where one argument is dispositive of the 
appeal, we need not address the defendant's 
remaining arguments) 
III Batson and its Progeny 
+
*18 Valdez claims the State engaged m 
impermissible gender discrimination during the 
selection of the jury In Batson v Kentucky, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution governs the use of 
peremptory challenges by prosecutors m criminal 
trials See 476 U S 79, 106 S Ct 1712, 90 
L Ed 2d 69 (1986) In Batson, the United States 
Supreme Court stated that although a defendant has 
"no right to a 'petit jury composed m whole or m 
part of persons of his own race,' " id at 85, 106 
S Ct at 1717 (citation omitted), a "defendant does 
have the right to be tried by a jury whose members 
are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria " 
Id at 85-86, 106 S Ct at 1717 In JEB v. 
Alabama, 511 U S 127, 114 S Ct 1419, 128 
L Ed 2d 89 (1994), the United States Supreme 
Court extended the holding of Batson to protect 
litigants from gender discrimination m the jury 
selection process "We have recognized that 
litigants have an equal protection right to jury 
selection procedures that are free from state-
sponsored group stereotypes rooted m, and 
reflective of, historical prejudice We hold that 
gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for 
juror competence and impartiality " Id at 128-29, 
114 SCt at 1421 
The litigants are harmed by the risk that the 
prejudice that motivated the discriminatory 
selection of the jury will infect the entire 
proceedings 
When state actors exercise peremptory challenges 
m reliance on gender stereotypes, they ratify and 
reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities 
of men and women Because these stereotypes 
have wreaked injustice in so many other spheres of 
our country's public life, active discrimination by 
litigants on the basis of gender during jury 
selection "invites cynicism *299 respecting the 
jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the 
law " The potential for cynicism is particularly 
acute m cases where gender-related issues are 
prominent, such as cases involving rape, sexual 
harassment, or paternity Discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges may create the impression 
that the judicial system has acquiesced m 
suppressing full participation by one gender or that 
the "deck has been stacked" m favor of one side 
Id at 140, 114 S Ct at 1427 (citations omitted) 
[16] **19 Pursuant to Batson, Utah courts apply a 
three-step test to determine whether the prosecutor 
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has engaged m prohibited discrimination during the 
jury selection process See State v Cantu, 778 P 2d 
517, 518 (Utah 1989) (applying three-step test to 
question of racial discrimination) This test equally 
applies m cases of gender discrimination See State 
v Jensen, 2003 UT App 273,K 13, 76 P 3d 188 
(applying three-step test to question of gender 
discrimination) We have stated the test as follows 
M[0]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge 
has made out a prima facie case of [gender] 
discrimination (step 1), the burden of production 
shifts to the proponent of the strike to come 
forward with a [gender]-neutral explanation (step 
2) If a [gender]-neutral explanation is tendered, 
the trial court must then decide (step 3) whether 
the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful 
[gender] discrimination " 
Id atU 13 (quoting State v Colwell, 2000 UT 8,1f 
17, 994 P 2d 177 (other citation omitted)) 
(alterations m original) 
**20 In the State's brief, it concedes that it waived 
the issue of whether Valdez presented a prima facie 
case of discrimination See Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at [^ 
18, 994 P 2d 177 (stating prosecution must 
challenge sufficiency of prima facie case before 
providing rebuttal explanation for strike, or issue is 
waived) Thus, we examme only step two of the 
analysis 
[17][18] **21 Under this step, even "suspect" 
explanations must be deemed "facially valid" unless 
they are "inherently discriminatory " State v. 
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,H 10, 41 P 3d 1153, see 
also Hernandez v New York, 500 U S 352, 360, 
111 SCt 1859, 1866, 114 L Ed 2d 395 (1991) 
("Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent m the 
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be 
deemed [gender] neutral ") Although this step 
"does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, 
or even plausible," Purkett v Elem, 514 U S 765, 
767-68, 115 SCt 1769, 1771, 131 L Ed 2d 834 
(1995), it does "require[ ] the proponent of the 
peremptory challenge, the prosecutor m this case, to 
come forward with a [gender]-neutral explanation 
for the challenge " Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at ^ 17, 994 
P 2d 177 Utah courts have enumerated a number 
of factors that must be considered within the context 
of the case at hand to determine whether the 
prosecution has offered a legitimate explanation 
The second step [of the analysis] requires "the 
prosecutor to come forward with a race-neutral 
explanation for the challenge " This step "does 
not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or 
even plausible " So long as the reasons given are 
" '(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, 
(3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) 
legitimate/ " " 'the reason[s] offered will be 
deemed race neutral ' " 
Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at H 9, 41 P 3d 1153 
(citations omitted) 
**22 The courts have been instructive m defining 
and applying each of these factors For example, m 
Hidalgo v Fagen, Inc , the Tenth Circuit was asked 
to decide whether a defendant's explanation for a 
peremptory strike was facially neutral See 206 
F 3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cn 2000) In that case, the 
defendant struck a Hispanic woman from the venire, 
explaining that it was because of her youth See id 
The court, looking specifically at the facial validity 
of the defendant's explanation, concluded the strike 
was neutral, holding "A neutral explanation means 
an explanation based on something besides the race 
of the juror Unless discriminatory intent is 
inherent in the justification, the reason offered will 
be deemed race neutral " Id at 1019 Such a 
rationale is similarly applied to show gender 
neutrality 
*300 **23 The " legit Lmate" factor is closely 
related to the "neutral" factor As this court has 
noted, the Supreme Court has provided guidance m 
determining whether the reason for a peremptory 
strike is legitimate " 'a "legitimate reason" is not a 
reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not 
deny equal protection ' " State v Merrill, 928 P 2d 
401, 404 (Utah Ct App 1996) (citation omitted) 
For example, m Merrill, the defendant claimed that 
the reason the prosecutor gave for his peremptory 
challenge was not legitimate See id The 
prosecutor had dismissed a potential juror who was 
Asian See id at 402 The reason for the dismissal, 
the prosecutor explained, was because he feared the 
potential juror would be biased against law 
enforcement due to a recent speeding ticket See id 
We concluded that was a legitimate explanation 
because it "does not deny a potential juror equal 
protection " Id at 404 
[19] *M24 The reason for a peremptory strike must 
also be related to the case being tried In State v 
Cantu, a prosecutor's reason for a peremptory strike 
of a Hispanic potential juror was invalidated m part 
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because it was unrelated to the juror or the case 
See 778 P 2d 517, 519 (Utah 1989) The 
prosecutor's proffered reason for the strike was 
because he was angry with defense counsel See id 
The Utah Supreme Court held that this explanation 
was desultory, and thus insufficient to fulfill the 
Batson requirement that peremptory strikes must be 
based upon grounds reasonably related to the case at 
bar See id. 
[20] [21] **25 Finally, the reason for a peremptory 
strike must be clear and reasonably specific This 
factor prevents a prosecutor from merely denying 
the existence of a discriminatory motive or by 
generally proclaiming good faith, ensuring that 
equal protection will not become a "vain and 
illusory requirement " Batson v Kentucky, 476 
U S 79, 98, 106 S Ct 1712, 1724, 90 L Ed 2d 69 
(1986) Rather, it requires the prosecutor "to 
articulate a neutral explanation related to the 
particular case, giving a clear, concise and 
reasonably specific legitimate explanation for 
excusing those jurors " New Mexico v Aragon, 109 
N M 197, 784 P 2d 16, 21 (1989) There must 
also be support in the record for such an 
explanation See State v Macial, 854 P 2d 543, 
547 (Utah Ct App 1993) For example, m Aragon, 
the prosecutor struck two prospective jurors who 
were black because they were possibly related to the 
defendant See 784 P 2d at 17 The New Mexico 
Supreme Court noted that nothing m the record 
showed the prosecutor had any basis for his opinion 
that the potential jurors might be untrustworthy, 
other than his own statement of their possible blood 
relationship See id As a result, the court ruled 
that "[t]he prosecutor's explanation was hardly 'a 
clear, concise, and reasonably specific explanation 
for excusing those jurors ' " Id at 21 (citation 
omitted) Accordingly, the court reversed the trial 
court See id 
IV Valdez's Batson Challenge 
[22][23] **26 With that analytical framework in 
mmd, we approach Valdez's step two challenge 
Valdez's argument that the State's peremptory 
challenges violated equal protection is persuasive 
Specifically, Valdez argues that the State's reason 
for using peremptory challenges to strike only 
women was not reasonably clear or specific As m 
Aragon, there is little in the record to demonstrate 
that the State had any basis for its strikes of these 
four women For example, as Valdez aptly notes, 
the State explains that Jurors Morely and Valeno 
were "overly compassionate" and Gonzalez was 
"matter of fact" without providing any clear basis 
for its opinions other than these cursory 
descriptions Further, the prosecutor stated 
variously I felt her responses lined up in a way that 
would make her not a helpful witness for the 
State [H]er responses to me seemed matter of 
fact and I felt like her responses would not make her 
a good juror for the State I don't recall what it 
was [about Ms Thornton], there was something that 
I immediately decided that I would make her one of 
my strikes " These explanations all fall short of 
being reasonably clear and specific It is not enough 
for the prosecutor simply to describe a 
nondiscriminatory motive without tying it to 
something specific about the juror herself See 
United States v *301 Horsley, 864 F 2d 1543, 1546 
(11th Cir 1989) (holding prosecutor's explanation 
that he struck juror because "I just got a feeling 
about him" "obviously [fell] short" of being 
reasonably clear and specific) 
[24] **27 If the prosecutor cites demeanor as a 
reason for striking a juror, courts should apply 
"particularly careful scrutiny" because "such after-
the-fact rationalizations are susceptible to abuse " 
Brown v Kelly, 973 F 2d 116, 121 (2nd Cir 1992) 
Although not required, prosecutors "would be well 
advised to make contemporaneous notes as to the 
specific behavior on the prospective juror's part that 
renders such person unsuitable for service on a 
particular case " Id In this case, however, the State 
was hardly clear, concise, or reasonably specific in 
its explanations It offered nothing more than vague 
and generic descriptions of the jurors that anyone 
would concede are nondiscriminatory, but which do 
not appear to have anything to do with the jurors 
themselves This is not sufficient to satisfy our 
equal protection jurisprudence, and is sufficient m 
itself to reverse the trial court's treatment of the 
State's peremptory strike 
**28 In addition to not being reasonably clear and 
specific, some of the State's explanations were 
unrelated to the case at hand For example, the 
State struck Thornton because she had been on a 
jury that had found a defendant, who had been 
charged with murder, guilty of manslaughter As 
Valdez correctly notes, other than being a criminal 
offense, manslaughter has nothing to do with the 
present case Valdez was not charged with 
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manslaughter or any other lesser-included offenses 
Furthermore, Thornton's participation on a jury that 
convicted another defendant of manslaughter does 
not undermine her ability to be impartial m the 
present case 
[25] **29 The State argues in its brief that these 
explanations were not inherently discriminatory 
because nothing m the explanations themselves 
pointed directly to the sorts of invidious stereotypes 
the law condemns While this may be true, the test 
for determining the legitimacy and facial neutrality 
of an explanation m the Batson context is the list of 
factors outlined in Cannon, see 2002 UT App 18,If 
9, 41 P 3d 1153, and analyzed above Unless the 
neutral explanation offered by the State may, on its 
face, be tied to the issues, evidence, and context of 
the case at hand, the explanation will not be 
considered legitimate Rather, we will consider the 
explanation mere pretext as a matter of law, 
unrelated as it is to the reality of the proceedings 
before the district court 
**30 Were we to hold otherwise, we would 
sanction the use of fanciful and spurious 
explanations for even the most sinister 
discriminatory motives Without the requirement 
that the explanation at least have, on its face, a 
grounding m the context of the case itself, racist or 
sexist motives could more easily be masked by 
unrelated but inherently nondiscriminatory 
explanations In such a case, the district court 
would have no need to proceed to step three to 
plumb the depths of the prosecutor's motivations 
because the State had offered nothing concrete by 
way of explanation See State v Chatwin, 2002 UT 
App 363,1) 20, 58 P 3d 867 (holding State did not 
offer legitimate step two explanation, obviating the 
need to proceed to step three) This is just such a 
case The prosecutor's explanations had no clear 
and specific basis m the case at hand Thus, we 
hold it was an abuse of the district court's discretion 
to determine the explanations were 
nondiscriminatory and to proceed to step three 
CONCLUSION 
**31 The State's peremptory strikes should have 
been invalidated by the trial court because the State 
failed to offer facially legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
explanations The explanations were neither clear 
and specific nor related to the case being tried 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial 
**32 WE CONCUR JUDITH M BILLINGS, 
Presiding Judge and PAMELA T GREENWOOD, 
Judge 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Addendum C 
R U L E 18. SELECTION OF THE JURY 
(a) The judge shall determine the method' of selecting' the jury and notify the 
parties at a pretrial conference or otherwise prior to trial! The following proce-
dures for,selection are .not exclusive. 
(1) Sinke and Reptace Method. The court shall summon the number of the 
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any2 
alternates, for all peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges for cause 
granted. At the direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order. 
The judge may hear and determine challenges for cause during the course of 
questioning or at the end thereof.- The judge^may and, at the request of any party, 
shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the hearing of the jurors. 
After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to
 v fill the 
vacancy, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges 
for cause are completed^ the clerk shall provide a list of the jurors remaining, and 
each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory 
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all 
peremptory challenges^ are ^exhausted[ or waived. _ The clerk shall then calj the 
remaining jurors, or so many of them'as shall be^necessary to constitute the jury, 
including any alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall 
constitute the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors called 
shall be the alternates, unless otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
, (2) Struck Method. The court SAhall summon the number of jurors that are to try 
the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any alternates, for all 
peremptory challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause granted. At the 
direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge mayL 
hear and determine challenges for cause during the course of questioning or at the 
end thereof. The judge may and, at the request of any party, shall hear, and 
determine challenges for cause outside the hearing of the jurors. When the 
challenges for cause^ aret completed, the clerk shall provide' a list of the jurors 
remaining, and each side, "beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its 
peremptory challenge to
 ;one juror at a time in regular^ turn until all peremptory 
challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, 
or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any 
alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the 
jury/ If alternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the 
alternates, unless otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order by 
computer, the clerk may call the jurors in that random order. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examination of 
the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination.1 In the latter event, 
the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the examination by 
such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the prospective 
jurors additional questions" requested by counsel or the defendant. Prior to 
examining the jurors, the court may make a preliminary statement of the case. The 
court may permit the parties or their attorneys to make a preliminary statement of 
the case, and notify the parties in advance of trial. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror, 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for the trial 
of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all jurors 
summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from 
the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing, summoning and 
return of the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn and shall 
be in writing or made upon the record. It shall specifically set forth the facts 
constituting the grounds of the challenge, 
(iii) If a ^ challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing may 
be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is based. The jurors 
challenged, and any other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing 
thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge tt> the panel is 
allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is 
concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors 
to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A 
challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn to try 
the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror 
is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the 
rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. AH 
challenges for cause shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason need be 
given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other 
felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor 
cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. If there is more than 
one defendant the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges 
and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly. 
(e) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be heard 
and determined by the court. The juror challenged and any other person may be 
examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause may 
be taken on one or more of the following grounds. On its own motion the court may 
remove a juror upon the same grounds. 
(1) Want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law. 
(2) Any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of performing 
the duties of a juror. 
(3) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to be 
injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was institut-
ed. 
f (4) The existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party^ witness or person alleged to have beer? 
victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively*, 
would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of favoritism. A^ prospective juror 
shall not be disqualified solely because, the juror is indebted to or employed by the 
state or a political subdivision thereof., 
(5) Having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or 
having complained against or having been accused by the defendant in a criminal 
prosecution. 
(6) Having served on the grand jury which found tfie indictment. 
(7) Having served on a trial jury which has tried another'person for the particular 
offense charged 
(8) Having teen one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and whose 
verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after the case was 
submitted tp it: 
(9) Havir~ berved as a juror in a civil action brought against the detendant for 
the act charged as an offense, nr 
(10) If the'offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of opinions 
about the, death penalty as would preclude the juror from voting to impose the death 
penalty followingconviction or would require the juror to impose the death penalty 
following conviction regardlesp of the facts. 
(ID TWansp the inrnf* iVnr! within one j ea r preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in tarrying^ on any business, calling^or employment, Jhe carrying on o$ 
which is a' violation, of law, where., defendant is charged with a like offense." 
(12) Because the juror has been a witness, either for or against the defendant on 
tKe preliminary examination or before the grand jury.*" 
\l3) Having £ormed*or' expressed ,an unqualified opinion or belief as to whether 
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged. 
U4) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reasonably 
lead the court to conclude the juror is not hkely to act impartially.' No person may 
serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge ^convinced the juror can and will 
act impartially and fairly. 
\f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and tnen oy uie 
defense alternately*- Challenges for cause shall be completed before Deremntorv 
challenges are taken." 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled Alternate jurors, in 
the order m which they'are called,} shall replace jurorsfwho, prior tq^the time the 
jury retires to'cohsider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their 
duties.
 xThe prosecution and jlefense shall each have one additional peremptory 
challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen. Alternate jurors shall be selected 
k at the same time and in the same manner, shall have the' same qualifications, shall 
"be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath and 
shall have the same functions, powers, and privileges as principal jurors. Except in 
bifurcated proceedings, an alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror 
shall be discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict/ The identity of the 
alternate jurors may be withheld until the jurors begin deliberations, 
(h) When the jury is selected an'oath shall be administered to the jurors, in 
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in issue 
between the parties, and render a true ^eHicf according to the evidence and the 
instructions of the court. 
JURY & WITNESS ACT § 78-46-16 
Note 1 
§ 7 8 - 4 6 - 1 6 , Jury not selected in conformity with chapter—Procedure to 
challenge—Relief available—Exclusive remedy 
i 
(1) Within seven days after the moving party discovered, or by the exercise of 
diligence could have discovered the grounds therefore, and in any event before 
the trial jury is sworn to try the case, a party may move to stay the proceedings 
or to quash an indictment, or for other appropriate relief, on the ground of 
substantial failure to comply with this act l in selecting h grand or trial jury. 
(2) Upon motion filed under this section containing a sworn statement of acts 
which if true would constitute a substantial failure to comply with this act, the 
moving party may present testimony of the county clerk, the clerk of the court, 
any relevant records and papers not public or otherwise available used by the 
jury commission or the clerk, and any other relevant evidence. If the court 
determines that in selecting either a grand or a trial jury there has been a 
substantial failure to comply with this act and it appears that actual and 
substantial injustice and prejudice has resulted or will result to a party in 
consequence of the failure, the court shall stay the "proceedings pending the 
selection of the jury in conformity with this act, quash an indictment, or grant 
other appropriate relief. 
(3) The procedures prescribed by this section are the exclusive means by 
which a person accused of a crime, the state, or 'a party in a civil case may 
challenge a jury on the ground that the jury was not selected in conformity with 
this act. 
Laws 1979, c. 130, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 153, § 25i< 
1
 Laws 1979, c 130 that enacted this chapter. 
Addendum D 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MS. THORNTON: My name is Tamara Thornton. I work at 
Thornton Plumbing and Heating, I've worked there about 20 years 
and I do payroll and benefits. Two years of college. My 
husband's name is Clay and he is an owner at Thornton Plumbing 
and Heating. We have three children, 20, 17 and 13. Deseret 
News comes to our home and Popular Science and such like that. 
Hobbies, I enjoy reading and take Irish folk dancing 
classes, things like that. 
THE COURT: Are you in a group9 
MS, THORNTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is it like river dance? 
MS. THORNTON: It's like river dance but I'm just a 
beginner, so I'm not going to do any demonstrations. 
THE COURT: That was my next question. And your 
fanly company, how big is it9 
MS. THORNTON: We have 58 employees. It's a 
third-generation company. 
THE COURT: So does it do subcontracting, is it in a 
building? 
MS. THORNTON: Yes, we are usually a subcontractor 
doing plumbing, radiant heating, HVAC, snow melting. That's 
kind of our specialty, the radiant --
THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. 
MS. VALERIO: My name is Lynda Valerio. I'm an 
14 
office manager for a nonprofit agency called the Burn Injury 
Association of Utah. I also train individuals with sustained 
orain injuries to return to employment. 
I have a high school education with some trade 
schooling classes that I've taken. My husband's name is Chris. 
He is a customer service representative with a cell phone 
company here in Salt Lake. We have two children, one will be 
five in two weeks and a daughter that is 16 months old. My 
husband gets Sports Illustrated and that's the only magazine or 
newspaper we get. Hobbies, I enjoy camping and any outdoor 
activities, any crafts, ceramics and things like that. 
THE COURT: Tell me a little bit about this nonprofit 
chat you work for. Is it totally private donations or are you 
able to get any federal funding for that? 
MS, VALERIO: We apply for grants so that we can 
provide services for these individuals but we are the only 
agency brain injury association m the state of Utah, so ,e 
serve the whole state for resources and --
THE COURT: Do you also work on issues such as 
housing and that? 
MS. VALERIO: We do. If an individual is in need of 
housing, medical assistance, anything like that, we do refer 
them out to professionals that can help them with that. 
THE COURT: Do you also set up sort of a continuous 
support0 It seems that the issue of housing and being able to 
15 
function on a day-to-day basis is a very real issue. 
MS. VALERIO: Yeah, we help them to get connected 
TA_cn independent living skills, we also help with doing that 
training. 
THE COURT: Thanks. 
MS. CURTIS: My name is Peggy Curtis. I was a 
substitute teacher for over 32 years. I worked mainly in the 
Granite School District. I have both elementary and secondary 
certificates, which of course I have the bachelor's degree but 
some post education. I have temporarily retired from that. My 
husband is Alan, and he has retired from Questar Gas, which is 
Mountain Fuel. We retired just about a couple years ago, so it 
may not be a permanent retirement, we may be going back to 
work. 
We have two children, I have a son that's 32 and then 
I had another son who we lost to a sudden onset of cancer three 
years ago, and he was 2 6 at the time. I also have a grandbaby, 
she'll be a year old next month, our pride and joy. 
We subscribe to the Tribune and read it quite 
regularly. My husband also takes Outdoor Life. We own a home 
in Beaver Dam, Arizona, which is between St. George and 
Mesquite on 1-15 and we spend some of our winter times down 
there. So we enjoy gardening down there and up here in the 
summer Down there it's too hot. And we have a motor home 
and --
16 
THE COURT: Where is this town? I didn't think there 
was anything on that little strip. 
MS. CURTIS: It's in the Arizona strip. It's 8 miles 
north of Mesquite, 26 miles south of St. George and it is in v 
what they call the Arizona strip. Littlefield is what you'll 
sometimes see on the off ramp of 1-15. It's a retirement 
community and it's maybe, I don't know, a thousand people. A 
lot of them will leave in the summer, you know, when it's too 
hot and go back up, kind of like snowbirds. 
THE COURT: Is it east or west of 1-15? 
MS. CURTIS: Some people will say north or south, 
depending how the road goes. As you're going south it's on the 
right. And actually there's two towns, Littlefield is on the 
left of the freeway as you're going south and Beaver Dam is on 
the right. They've combined them, they're not incorporated 
towns. So, you know, there is an elementary school, it's 
growing quite rapidly down there with some regular full 
families moving in a lot now too, but we just have a summer 
home. 
THE COURT: Do they commute? 
MS. CURTIS: A lot of them in Mesquite and some in 
St. George. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MS. ROBERTS: My name is Christine Roberts. I work 
at Bausch & Lomb assembling medical devices. High school 
17 
education. I'm divorced. I have three children, three boys, 
IS, 14 and 11. They keep me quite busy. Right now we don't 
subscribe to any magazines or newspapers other than the TV 
guide. And hobbies, my boys' sports and we're actively 
involved in our Catholic church, we do a lot of things to help 
out people and stuff. And that's about it. 
THE COURT: I thought Bausch & Lomb is -- doesn't 
that make lenses? 
MS. ROBERTS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that what you do? 
MS. ROBERTS: No, we actually produce an orb scan 
ic's called, and it scans your eyes, the posterior and exterior 
of your eyes and it's a -- right on the temple. 
THE COURT: Is that to check for --
MS. ROBERTS: It measures the posterior and exterior 
of your eye to find anything wrong with your eyes. 
THE COURT: Like astigmatism or something like that? 
MS. ROBERTS: Uh-huh. Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: So the actual manufacturing facility is 
right here in Salt Lake? 
MS. ROBERTS: Yes, it's here. There's about 3 5 or 4 0 
employees there. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thanks. 
MS. GONZALEZ: My name is Joyce Gonzalez and I'm 



























level education. And my spouse's name is Jessie and he retired 
from Hercules. And I have three children, 45, 43 and 41, a 
daughter and two sons. And we take the Tribune and just craft 
magazines. And my hobbies, we have a cabin at Scofield 
Reservoir that takes up a lot of our time in the summer, and my 
grandchildren. 
THE COURT: How many grandchildren do you have? 
MS. GONZALEZ: Four. 
THE COURT: Now, what are you trying to retire from? 
MS. GONZALEZ: Well, I clean houses for my children 
and they don't want me to quit. I'm ready to quit. So I'm 
trying to quit. 
THE COURT: Good luck. Thanks. 
MS. UNGVICHIAN: My name is Jennifer Ungvichian. I'm 
a full-time student up at the university and an office manager 
for Spiral Productions and Higher Ground Learning. I am a 
sophomore up at the University. I'm not married and don't have 
any kids. We don't take any magazines or newspapers at our 
house. And when I'm not working or going to school I'm 
studying or I do yoga and volunteer at the Road Home. That's 
it. 
THE COURT: What are you studying at the U? 
MS. UNGVICHIAN: I'm a mass communications major. 
THE COURT: Do you want to -- are you planning on 





















: I retired out of the International 
Okay. Do you have any patents or do you 
I've got one I'm working on. 
All right. Thanks. 
My name is Paula Morely. I work part 
Jordan School District and I give piano lessons in my 
have 
s^ Russell, hi 
We have f 
a college degree, a bachelor's. My spouse's name 
s is a store manager for the Deseret Book Company. 
lve children, one of whom is deceased. The others are 
















:ake the Readers Digest and the Deseret News at 









outdoors things with my family, camping 
games and things. 
Utah, BYU? 
BYU. 
That's okay to say that in Salt Lake. 
One's as bad as the other. 
What do you do at the Jordan School 
Title one aide in an elementary school. 
computer lab. 
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THE COURT: What does title one mean? Is it a 
designation? 
MS, MORLEY: It's a federal program to help boost the 
reading and math levels. 
THE COURT: Is it sort of a resource --
MS. MORLEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- position? 
MS. MORLEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. PAULSEN: My name is Jeff Paulsen. I'm a 
full-time student, a photographer for the daily Utah Chronicle. 
I'm working on my undergraduate degree in urban planning. My 
wife's name is Jennifer. She is the campaign coordinator for 
cne Leukemia Lymphoma Society. Two spoiled dogs, so many 
magazines I wouldn't even want to go there. 
THE COURT: They're not illegal publications; right? 
MR. PACE: Oh, no. We just get a lot of door to door 
in the Avenues, and probably every neighborhood, but they just 
pile up. Hobbies, leisure activities, anything that involves 
adrenaline and gear I'm pretty much a sucker for. 
THE COURT: Okay. Where is the urban planning 
degree? What department is that in, is it in --
MR, PAULSEN: It's in the geography department. 
THE COURT: Is there an overlapping with 
architecture? 
28 
And, Mr. O'Connell, I'm going to ask you to do the 
same thing, introduce yourself and your client, any witnesses 
you may call. 
MR. O'CONNELL: My name is John O'Connell, Jr., I got 
my JD degree and I represent Anthony James Valdez. Do you want 
to stand up? And other than the State's witnesses -- we may 
call other witnesses if they don't, but that's all the 
witnesses we have. 
THE COURT: Do either of you know Mr. O'Connell or 
Mr. Valdez? If so, please raise your hand. All right. No 
hands have been raised. 
Have any of you heard or read anything about this 
case? If so, please raise your hand. All right. 
Yeah, Ms. Thornton. 
MS. THORNTON: I believe I heard about it on the news 
months ago. 
THE COURT: Do you have any specific recollection of 
this case? 
MS. THORNTON: Not specific, no. 
THE COURT: And just answering yes or no, is there 
anything about your knowledge that you believe would affect 
your ability to be an impartial juror in this case? 
MS. THORNTON: No. 
THE COURT: Yes, Ms. Curtis. 
MS. CURTIS: I believe I also remember just reading 
34 
generally about it, but nothing specific. 
THE COURT: Any impressions that you feel would 





CURTIS: I hope not, I don't think so. 
COURT: No further hands have been raised. Oops. 
GONZALEZ: I recall seeing it on the news and --
COURT: Okay. Do you believe that having heard 
something about this would interfere with your ability to serve 




it as well. 
THE 
this case9 
GONZALEZ: I don't think so. 
COURT: I see. Yes. 
WEIGHT: I just remember reading generally about 
COURT: Okay. Anything about wnat you heard that 
you believe would interfere with your ability to serve as a 
juror in this 
MS. 
case? 
WEIGHT: I -- well, I probably should admit to 
the court after being married to a cop for almost 20 years I 
have some issues, yes. 
THE 
after a while 
regard to law 
All 
COURT: You know, we may talk to you m chambers 
about that. There will be further questions with 
enforcement issues too. 
right. Anyone else9 All right. Let me explain 
to you a little bit about the function of the various parties 



















COURT: Okay. So it was a civil -- you indicated 




COURT: As part of your professional expertise? 
JACOBSON: Correct. 
COURT: And you actual did 
JACOBSON: Yes. 
COURT: Anything about that 
testify at 
: experience 
affect your ability to be an impartial 
JACOBSON: No. 
COURT: Mr. Paulsen? 
PAULSEN: I was a witness as well as a 







COURT: The criminal trial 
in and the civil --
PAULSEN: Same. 
COURT: Same circumstance, 
Anyone else? 
Have any of you ever served on 
raise your hands. 
Ms. 
MS. 
Thornton, do you recall if 
THORNTON: Criminal. 






okay, all right. 
a jury before? If so, 
it was --
4 9 
THE COURT: How long ago was that? 
MS. THORNTON: Eight years ago. 
THE COURT: Do you recall whether the jury was able 
to reach a verdict? 
MS. THORNTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you recall what that was? 
MS. THORNTON: Yeah, he was found guilty of 
manslaughter. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything about that experience you 
believe would affect your ability to serve on this jury? 
MS. THORNTON: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Others? 
Okay. Ms. Zingleman, civil or criminal? 
MS. ZINGLEMAN: Two criminal. 
THE COURT: How long ago? 
MS. ZINGLEMAN: One was about four years ago and one 
was about 17. 
THE COURT: You're just lucky. Some people haven't 
even been called before probably. 
Were the juries able to reach verdicts in those 
cases? 
MS. ZINGLEMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you recall what they were? 
MS. ZINGLEMAN: They were both guilty. One was a 
disorderly drunken driving and the other was convicted of rape. 
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follow the instructions then it creates a problem, but Mr. Pace 
said that he couldn't give police the same weight as any other 
witness simply because of the police status, and he also 
responded that his friend had been charged and he didn't like 
the way that turned out and, therefore, that would influence 
m s decision. 
MR. O'CONNELL: Also don't know what he means by 
that, he may give cops more weight. He actually works in I 
would say a law enforcement capacity, that's what I first 
thought when he said that, and if that's the case that's 
something I don't know that the State really can object to. 
THE COURT: I find an entirely different situation 
from victims and find that he indicated that he could not 
follow my instruction as to the law and that's an appropriate 
for-cause challenge. Okay. 
We're going to need to see these five, and I did them 
out of order. The first one is Ms. Stavros and I have four 
for-causes, Pace, Weight, Paulsen and Bass at this point. 
MR. O'CONNELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Hi, come on in. The attorneys are -- or 
at least one -- well, maybe both attorneys have just a couple 
follow-up questions. 
Mr. O'Connell? 
MR. O'CONNELL: Yeah, you mentioned that I guess you 
were a victim of abuse in a marriage? 
54 
MS. STAVROS: Uh-huh. 
MR. O'CONNELL: Can you tell me more about -- was 
that something that happened early in the marriage? You said 
you were married for quite a long period of time. Or was that 
what ended the marriage? 
MS. STAVROS: Actually, it didn't happen until the 
end, you know, close to the end of the marriage, and it was 
just a -- it was actually more emotional abuse than really 
physical abuse. And it was just a combination of situations 
and everything and, you know, I -- it wasn't something that, 
you know, I harbor any feelings about. 
THE COURT: And you've been divorced for ten years 
now, did you say? 
MS. STAVROS: Twenty-three. 
THE COURT: Yeah, you've actually been divorced for 
2 3 years. 
MS. STAVROS: Uh-huh. 
MR. O'CONNELL: Also I wanted to ask you, you said 
that you -- also that your son was assaulted and you went to 
crial on it. 
MS. STAVROS: Yeah. 
MR. O'CONNELL: You said you tried to blank it out. 
Why is that? 
MS. STAVROS: Just because it's been a very hard 











and he can t do that because he has a shake now 
-it's created, you know, some situations in his 
ldn*t have 
, you know, 
been there if the assault didn't occur. 
I've just tried to not look at that 











to relive it 1 





Okay. And you said you went to trial 
Uh-huh. 
And it was a criminal case? 
Yeah. I did not have to testify. And 
never took it to a jury trial is because the 
like it would be too traumatic for my son to have 
because it had been a whole year and he was making 



















So how did it resolve? 
The one person that did the actual 
bat did go to jail. 
So he pled to something, I take it? 
What? 
There was some sort of plea bargain 
that you didn't take it to trial? 
STAVROS: We just didn't want to go to trial 
because it was something that the psychologists did not think 
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i have be 
MS. 
live through 
0 ' CONNELL: 
again. 
How did you feel about all 




no matter what happened, you can't erase what 
0»CONNELL: What about how it resolved 







if something could have been more --
STAVROS: That's a hard question to answer. 
















And knowing that this is a 
assault, do you think that 














hope it wouldn't because, you know, 
every situation is different. 
You hope but you're not sure? 
m not positive really, you 
like I'm really a pretty 
I would look at everything. 
Okay. 


























COURT: Just a follow-up question or two. I'm 


















is Ms. Tamara Thornton. 
You said that you were a victim of 
No, I never said that. 
, she said she'd heard something about 
I'm sorry. 
Then I was a juror. 
Let me ask 
What do you 
-- you said you heard 
remember hearing9 
I don't have a real strong memory of 
just vaguely remember the name 
was an . individual broke into a 
remember a lot about it. 
was the c 
Must • --
MR, O'CONNELL: 






m g about in 
I guess I'm 
And other t 
seemed familiar and that 
home, and I just really 
you sure that this case 
the news or are you 
not 100 percent sure. 
:han that, you heard an 
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individual had broken into a home, do you remember anything 
else about it? 
MS. THORNTON: Yeah, no. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burmester, questions? 
MR. BURMESTER: No. 
THE COURT: You indicated earlier that you would be 
able to set aside any of that. Do you feel at this point you 
would have any problem with weighing only the matters you hear 
in court? 
MS. THORNTON: No. 
THE COURT: The evidence? 
MS. THORNTON: No. 
MR. O'CONNELL: One other question: Was it in the 
newspaper or on TV? 
MS. THORNTON: It was on TV. 
THE COURT: All right. Thanks, Ms. Thornton. 
MR. OfCONNELL: It's Curtis, right? 
THE COURT: Is this Ms. Curtis? 
THE BAILIFF: Yes. 
THE COURT: Hi. 
MS. CURTIS: Hello. 
THE COURT: Just a couple of follow-up questions. 
I'm going to let the attorneys ask any --
MS. CURTIS: Then I did have something to say. I was 
thinking about it after you left and as a child I was a victim 
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of sex abuse. It was back in those days it was something that 
was not done. It was nothing severe, it never went -- it was 
in the family, it was my father, but it has never been -- I 
::.ean nobody knows it except my psychiatrist and -- you know, 
but it's something that has been in the past and has never --
you know, it was never brought up. 
Then there was also when I was about 15 babysitting 
there was -- like I said, the sex abuse was not -- there was no 
rape, it was more molestation, and babysitting I also was 
subjected to some unwanted touching and things when I was a 
teenager. And I went home at that time and told my father 
about it and he, a military man, was very -- I'll take care of 
this and had me scared to death, but he has never acknowledged 
anything that he had ever done. Prior to this day we still 
haven't, but I didn't -- in fact, it just hit me. 
THE COURT: That's fine to do this in a little bit 
more comfortable, less public forum. 
With regard to those issues, they happened when you 
were -- both of the times when you were still a child? 
MS. CURTIS: Very young, yes, correct. 
THE COURT: Do you believe that that would interfere 
with your ability to weigh the facts in this case? 
MS. CURTIS: No, absolutely not. I consider myself 
very professional that I would not do that. But I did want to 
let you know. 
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THE COURT: I appreciate that. 
Mr. O'Connell? I think Ms. Curtis indicated she may 
have heard something about this case. 
MR. OfCONNELL: You said you may have heard this case 
in the news? 
MS. CURTIS: Right. Like I said, I read the 
newspaper quite thoroughly but, again, I don't remember 
details. I do remember -- in my mind when you were reading 
over the charges it seemed in my mind I remembered something 
about wich the child abuse. It seems like there wasn't an 
abuse on the child but the child was present or something when 
there was some alleged abuse of a mother or a female or 
something. I mean in my mind this is -- now, whether it was 
this case or another, but this is what I kind of remember. 
Again, I don't remember anything, you know, other than that 
kind of -- because I guess I remember thinking, yeah, it's a 
first time I guess -- I remember thinking that child abuse can 
be something that the child endures visually or something as 
opposed to the physical. I remember thinking that. Now, 
again, I'm not sure it was this case, but I remember something 
of that kind. I'm thinking it might have been. 
THE COURT: Is there anything about perhaps hearing 
something in the news you believe would affect your ability to 
serve? Specifically, as I've instructed you, the only evidence 
you can weigh if you are on the jury is evidence that comes in 
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during the court proceeding. Do you believe you could follow 
that instruction? 
MS. CURTIS: I believe I can, yes. 
THE COURT: Any follow-up questions? 
MR. O'CONNELL: That was newspaper? You think that's 
where you heard it? 
MS. CURTIS: I believe it was. I believe it was the 
Tribune, is the one I read. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burmester? 
MR. BURMESTER: No questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thanks, Ms. Curtis. r 
MS. CURTIS: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: And you're Christine --
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Ms. Roberts, just a couple follow-up 
questions. I'm going to let the attorneys ask questions in 
here. 
Mr. O'Connell? 
MR. O'CONNELL: You said you were a victim of 
domestic violence; right? 
MS. ROBERTS: Yes. 
MR. O'CONNELL: Can you explain a little bit more? 
MS. ROBERTS: My son's dad beat me. 
MR. O'CONNELL: And how long ago was that? 
MS. ROBERTS: He's 11 and he was -- he was about four 
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years old, so 
MR. 
was this over 
maybe 
MS. 
about seven years ago. 
0 f CONNELL : Okay And 
a period of time? 
ROBERTS: No, it 
six months or a year. 
MR. 0'CONNELLJ Okay. 
wasn't any criminal case ever? 
MS. 
custody of my 
ROBERTS: 
son and I 











was over a 
Now, 
Mo, I mean I 
you 
came 
got a restraining 
go back to court c 
Okay. Why 
Why didn't 17 
Yeah. 
I was a 





- they ever call tl 
MS. 
they took him 
MR. 
ROBERTS: 
out of my 
0'CONNELL: 














this only li ke once or 
period of time. Over 
said that there 
to court to get 
order on him and then 
Dr anything, 
1t you press 
I was -- that's 






s -- I was 
my life 
or did 
jot the police and 
Is that the same time that 
Yes. 
Now, you al 
you got 
.so mentioned -- well, I 
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guess let me follow up on -- with that. This case also 
involves sort of a domestic situation. And do you think that 
the fact that you've been a victim of domestic violence may 
affect your ability to be fair in the case, do you think --
MS. ROBERTS: I don't feel that it would, just 
because I'm -- I don't -- I'm a fair person, you know, I don't 
like particularly -- I don't like particularly judge people 
or -- and I'm friends with my ex now, I mean I don't hold a 
grudge or -- it was just circumstance. But I don't feel that 
it would. 
MR. O'CONNELL: What about the victim, do you think 
you would have any sort of feelings towards this person? 
MS. ROBERTS: Being in their shoes type thing? 
MR. OfCONNELL: Being in their shoes, yeah. 
MS. ROBERTS: I don't know. 
MR. O'CONNELL: One last one. You also said that 
there was a witness with a burglary and I know you didn't 
actually witness it yourself, it was just in your home? 
MS. ROBERTS: Right. 
MR. O'CONNELL: But somebody broke in and did 
something to somebody in your house, what was it they were 
accused of doing --
MS. ROBERTS: Accused of -- it was ridiculous. The 
little girl, she's 16, she accused my neighbor of coming into 
my house and attempting -- she wanted to press charges for 
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attempted rape, but when it all came down, she invited him into 
my home and he was my neighbor, I knew him. And we went to 
court and they just called me because I was the owner of the 
house and wanted to know if I wanted to press charges for 
breaking and entering, which she allowed him into my home. So 
nothing -- I went to court but I didn't get called to the stand 
or anything, I just listened to what they said. 
MR. O'CONNELL: Okay. That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Mr. Burmester, any questions? 
MR. BURMESTER: No questions. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thanks, Ms. Roberts. You're free 
to leave. Thank you. 
Hi, Ms. Gonzalez. 
MS, GONZALEZ: Hello. 
THE COURT: Just a brief few questions maybe. It 
appears that -- I just noted that you saw -- you thought you'd 
heard something about this case on the news. 
MS. GONZALEZ: Uh-huh. 
MR. O'CONNELL: What do you remember exactly? 
MS. GONZALEZ: I remember hearing about the break-in 
in the area, just the address. With --
MR. OfCONNELL: What was the -- what area are we 
talking about? 
MS. GONZALEZ: Was it Ensign Avenue? 
THE COURT: Emery Street. 
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THE WITNESS: 
MS. GONZALEZ: Err-ry Street? It's just very vague 
because I just remember the name and the incident. 
MR. O'CONNELL: That's all you remember is that there 
was a break-in? 
MS. GONZALEZ: Exactly, yeah. 
MR. O'CONNELL: Are you sure that it's this incident 
we're talking about? 
MS. GONZALEZ: I think it is. Like I say, I read the 
newspaper every day, and it just sounded familiar to me. 
MR. O'CONNELL: Okay. That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Okay. I already asked this in court, but 
I'll just ask it again. You are required to weigh only the 
evidence that comes in to court through witnesses or otherwise, 
documentary evidence or exhibits. Do you believe that you 
could do that, that you could not think of anything you may 
have heard before about this and just weigh what is presented 
to you in court? 
MS. GONZALEZ: I think I could, uh-huh. 
THE COURT: All right. Good. 
Mr. Burmester, questions? 
MR. BURMESTER: No questions. 
THE COURT: All right, Ms. Gonzalez. Thank you. 
MS. GONZALEZ: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. I think Ms. Thornton, Ms. Curtis 
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and Ms, Gonzalez are fine, the ones that may have heard about 
the case. Mr. G'Connell, what about Ms. Stavros? 
MR. O'CONNELL: I'm still objecting to Ms. Stavros. 
I even know this, she says she thinks she can be fair but I 
think it's a different matter when you actually start hearing 
the case and hearing the evidence and the fact that she was a 
victim of abuse before and compounded by the fact that her son 
was also assaulted which was also -- as well as just the fact 
that what she originally said she said she tried to blank it 
out, could not remember until it popped up. That's what I 
worry about with victims. She said she hoped she would not, it 
would not affect her, but she was not sure. So I would -- I 
would ask that she be struck for cause. 
MR. BURMESTER: Ms. Stavros, I think with her 
responses to the son victim seemed unable to separate that, so 
I'm okay with — 
THE COURT: Okay. I agree. I'll strike her for 
cause. 
What about Ms. Roberts? 
MR. O'CONNELL: Again, what I'm concerned about in 
this case is we're going to have a victim who is going to come 
up and who is going to basically recant. 
THE COURT: Well, we don't know what she's going to 
do. 
MR. O'CONNELL: I'm pretty sure she's going to do 
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Addendum E 
copies of the convictions, the sentences in those cases, the 
]udgments. Okay. Did I represent that accurately? 
MR, 0 f CONNELL: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else before we 
break? 
I O1CONNELL: Yes, Your Honor. Your Honor, I 
noticed that when we were doing the jury selection that the 
State struck all women, and that's a basis for a Batson 
challenge. 
THE COURT: Not a Batson. 
MR. O'.ONNELL: Whatever the follow-up case is that 
extended Batson, the gender, and I think at this point all I 
need to do is establish that there was a pattern. And I think 
the fact that the State used all of their peremptories on 
women -- I don't know if there's any better evidence to show 
Maat there is a pattern of -- based on gender. I don't think 
we had any minorities at all, even Ms. Gonzalez didn't appear 
.o be Hispanic, so I don't think I'd have any based on race, 
but on the fact that the State moved every single one of the 
peremptories were based on --
THE i/OOP'Tr Mi. Burmester? 
MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, I think defense counsel's 
objection is untimely. We've seated this jury, sworn this 
jury, the proper Batson challenge must be made prior to that 
point. 
THE COURT: Well, not withstanding that, can you give 
me a basis to rebut Batson type challenge? 
MR. BURMESTER: Yes, Your Honor. With regard to the 
State's number one, the State chose to strike Ms. Valerio 
because she stated that she worked for a nonprofit brain injury 
type of place. That is not a basis upon which to strike her, 
but I felt her responses lined up in a way that would make her 
not a helpful witness for the State and that she would be 
somewhat overly compassionate. 
The second witness was Ms. Gonzalez. She had heard 
of the case and seemed -- though she said that it wouldn't 
bother her, her responses to me seemed matter of fact and I 
felt like her responses would not make her a good juror for the 
State. 
Ms. Thornton had also heard of the case and I don't 
recall what it was, there was something that I immediately 
decided that I would make her one of my strikes. She'd also 
been on a jury and he was found guilty of a manslaughter, which 
I thought was probably a one-step reduction, at least that's 
the assumption. So again, I felt like she was not going to be 
a helpful one for the State. 
The last one I agonized over whether to strike, 
No. 19, Paul Morely or 21 Ron Hardy, I conferred with my 
colleague, Ms. -- and we talked about it and she brought to my 
attention he was a hunter and that she felt like a hunter would 
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know things about guns and brought that point about that 
potential juror and another one. And after conferring with her 
I changed my mind and went -with Ms — and that was simply --
she was towards the end. I suppose there was also it felt like 
she was not strong, not — I'm sorry, I'm trying to read my 
notes here. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. BURMESTER: There was this pattern of -- her 
responses made me think she would be somebody, again, that 
might be willing to let bygones be bygones, what I would say 
overly compassionate, and it was just based on her responses 
about position, her responses to little subtle things like her 
teaching piano lessons and the magazines she chose. We don't 
have a lot to base these things on, so that's how I made those 
choices. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And I'm satisfied 
with your explanation, I find with regard to peremptory 
challenges No. 6, Tamara Thornton, No. 7 Linda Valerio, 
No. 10, Joyce Gonzalez, and No. 19, Paula Morely are gender 
neutral, they are related specifically to this case. They were 
clearly stated and they are specific and legitimate. Therefore 
I am denying the challenge based on gender. I also note this 
is a jury of four men and four women. 
MR , BURMESTER: Yes, Your Honor.. 
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